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PUNITIVE DAMAGES CRASH IN THE SECOND
CIRCUIT: IN RE AIR DISASTER AT LOCKERBIE,
SCOTLAND ON DECEMBER 21, 1988*
INTRODUCTION
Passengers on international flights are keenly aware of the
dangers associated with flying overseas." However, passengers on
international flights seldom consider the potential ramifications
of the mere purchase of an international airline ticket.2 Under
* 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 331 (1991). This case arises from
the consolidation of two district court cases: In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on
December 21, 1988, 733 F. Supp. 547 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) and In re Hijacking of Pan
American Airways, Inc. Aircraft at Karachi Int'l Airport, Pakistan on September 5, 1986,
729 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). This Comment is in no way intended to desensitize the
tragedy of Pan Am Flight 103 or any airline accident.
IDangers most frequently encountered include crashes due to mechanical failures,
bombings and hijackings. See, e.g., In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 703
F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir. 1983)(Western Airlines Flight 2605 crashes and kills 74 people
attempting to land at Mexico City); In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974,
684 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1982)(in Pan American jet crash, 106 passengers were
killed); In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989, No. MDL-817, 89
C 8082, 1991 WL 279005 (N.D. II. Dec. 26, 1991) (on United Airlines flight, 112 passen-
gers were killed when hydraulic system failed); In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland
on December 21, 1988, 733 F. Supp. at 549 (when a bomb exploded in the cargo hull of
Pan Am Flight 103 en route from London to New York, 259 persons were hilled); In re
Hijacking of Pan American World Airways, Inc. Aircraft at Karachi Int'l Airport, Paki-
stan on Sept. 5, 1986, 729 F. Supp. at 18 n.1 (when Pan Am Flight 73 hijacked en route
from Bombay to New York, 20 passengers were killed).
I For a discussion of the liability limits imposed on international travel, see infra
note 4 and accompanying text. Under the Montreal Agreement, see infra note 21, the
Convention requires that passengers be advised of the liability limitations on interna-
tional travel in 10-point type print. The limitations are required to be presented to pas-
sengers upon receipt of the ticket and are to spell out the potential liability limitations.
See In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.)
(holding that 8.5-point type print size did not meet the 10-point notice requirement and
thus prevented the airline from imposing the liability limitations of the Warsaw Conven-
tion), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983), reu'd in Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 US.
122 (1989). The notice requirement was instituted to provide passengers vith the oppor-
tunity to seek additional monetary protection by purchasing travel insurance. This addi-
tional coverage is considered independent of the $75,000 limitation imposed by the Con-
vention. In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw Poland, 705 F.2d at 86 n.3. While the
Convention does not require that passengers have actual notice of the limitations, the
10-point print size establishes constructive notice. A strong argument could be made that
passengers should be required to have actual notice, the probable result being that more
passengers would seek more adequate liability protection before traveling. However, it
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the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Transportation by Air (the "Warsaw Conven-
tion"),3 international air travelers are limited to a $75,000 recov-
ery against an airline for damages resulting in personal injury or
death.' There has been much debate about the inadequacies of
this limit and its inherent injustices,5 especially considering that
would be very difficult both to implement and enforce an actual notice requirement con-
sidering the millions of people who travel internationally each year and the evidentiary
problems that would arise in determining whether passengers had actual notice of the
limitations.
Recently, the Supreme Court has taken a more pro-airline view of the notice re-
quirement, holding that failure to supply notice in the 10-point print size did not waive
the Convention's liability limitations. Only in situations where passengers did not receive
a ticket or received a ticket where the shortcomings were so severe that the document
could not be considered a ticket would the Convention's liability limitations be waived.
See Chan, 490 U.S. at 129 n.3. This approach severely undermines the constructive no-
tice that passengers were to receive from the 10-point print size and increases the likeli-
hood that passengers will not obtain liability insurance.
' Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted at
49 U.S.C. § 1502 n.1, Warsaw Convention (1988). Approximately 110 nations are signato-
ries of the Warsaw Convention. For a compilation of the member nations, see Kimberlee
S. Cagle, The Role of Choice of Law in Determining Damages for International Aviation
Accidents, 51 J. AIR L. & Com. 953, 1000-01 (1986).
" While the Convention affects travel between almost every nation in the world, the
Convention's $75,000 liability limitation applies only to international flights originating
or terminating in the United States. The $75,000 limit reflects a special compromise
among members to ensure that the United States remained a signatory to the Conven-
tion. Cagle, supra note 3, at 958-59. Most nations do not subscribe to this limit, but
instead adhere to lower limits ranging from $8300 to $16,000 when the United States is
not a departure or termination point. Id. at 957-59.
1 See Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 497 (1967). This article presents a historical anal-
ysis of the various attempts to raise the liability limits under the Warsaw Convention
and recounts the United States' threat to withdraw from the Convention in 1965 if the
liability limits were not raised. It was such pressure that eventually led to the Montreal
Agreement, which raised the limit to $75,000 for flights originating or arriving in the
United States. The article however does not attempt to criticize the liability limits. In-
stead it brings out the fierce disagreement among member nations about raising liability
limits. See infra note 21 and accompanying text. For a critique of the Warsaw Conven-
tion's liability limits, see Cagle, supra note 3, ato988 (contrasting the varying degrees of
liability awards available under the Convention with awards available when the Conven-
tion is not applicable, thereby concluding that the Convention is not fulfilling one of its
main goals of establishing a uniform liability system). While Cagle's criticism has valid-
ity, since different nations do adhere to different monetary limits under the Convention,
there is a difference between nations applying different liability levels, which they cur-
rently do, and having varying liability levels within the jurisdiction of a single nation,
which would occur if plaintiffs were allowed to bring independent state claims. For a
discussion of the possible confusion that varying liability awards would add to the Con-
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there is no comparable limitation in domestic air travel.6
vention if independent state claims were available, see infra notes 139-79 and accompa-
nying text. See also P. Jacobs & B.F. Kiker, Accident Compensation for Airline Passen-
gers: An Economic Analysis of Liability Rules Under the Warsaw Convention, 51 J. Am.
L. & Con 589, 608 (1986) (arguing that the Convention's compensation scheme should
bear some relationship to the economic losses actually suffered by pasengers); David L.
Sheinfeld, From Warsaw to Tenerife: A Chronological Analysis of the Liability Limita-
tions Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 45 J. Am L. & Co.. 653, 681 (1980)
(criticizing the Convention for inadequately compensating passengers in airline accidents
and noting that United States courts have failed to address the issue of extending liabil-
ity limits and have subsequently prevented passengers from being sufficiently
compensated).
In a rather startling development, several Japanese airlines, including Japan Air
Lines, have announced they will withdraw from the liability limits imposed by the War-
saw Convention. This decision will allow claimants to seek unlimited liability against
these airlines. The Warsaw Convention specifically permits airlines to contract privately
for higher liability awards. The decision is undoubtedly a reflection of the embarrass-
ment most airlines and insurers feel when faced with inadequately compensating victims
of air disasters. Japan Air Lines believes this move will force the aviation industry to
revamp the Warsaw Convention and raise the liability risks of airlines. See Robert Rice,
Japanese Airlines to Scrap Limit on Liability for Victims, Fi. Tas (London), Nov.
19, 1992, at 1; Robert Rice, An Airline Decision Born of Embarrassment, Fn. Thmas
(London), Nov. 19, 1992, at 5.
8 The Warsaw Convention does not apply to domestic air travel See Cagle, supra
note 3, at 955. Therefore, the only limitations imposed on domestic aviation disaster
litigation are those imposed by state or federal law regulating wrongful death and per-
sonal injury actions. Id. Domestic aviation liability awards can potentially be in the hun-
dreds of millions of dollars. See, e.g., Court Absolves Government in Delta L-1011
Crash, AvwATioN Dxmy, Sept. 5, 1989, at 436 (estimating that potential liability from the
crash of a Delta flight in Dallas on August 2, 1985 could exceed $150-200 million); Settle-
ment, AVATION DAmy, Mar. 20, 1989 ('Settlement amounts from air transport crashes
are growing, with the average award in the 1987 Northwest crash in Detroit projected to
be $1 million, far above the $362,943 reported in a 1988 Rand Corp. study.... ."); Jim
Doyle, Jury Awards $600,000 to Couple in Air Accident, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 18, 1991, at
A2 (couple traveling aboard a United Airlines flight that split open in midair near Oahu,
Hawaii in 1989 were awarded $600,000); '2.7 Million Awarded in Aeromexico Crash,
N.Y. TniEs, Apr. 13, 1990, at 12 (federal court awards $2.7 million in damages to the
family of a father and son who died in a 1986 Aeromexico jet crash in California). The
Warsaw Convention was drafted specifically to prevent damage awards from reaching
such high levels in international air travel See infra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
Besides the high liability awards, domestic aviation litigation has been plagued by
severe complexities, mainly involving the difficult determination of which state wrongful
death or personal injury standards to apply when passengers from multiple states are
represented on a given flight. See Scott R. Paulsen, Choice of the Punitive Damage Law
in Airline Accidents: The Chicago Rule Comes Crashing Down, Summer 1990 J. CoRo. L
803, 847 (arguing that the choice of law analysis in determining whether punitive dam-
ages may be awarded is often the most critical issue in airline disaster litigation). For an
example of the confusing state of domestic airline litigation, see In re Air Crash Disaster
at Stapleton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colorado, on Nov. 15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1445 (D.
Colo. 1988) (holding that Texas law applied to punitive damage claims even though the
crash occurred in Colorado, the litigation was pending in Colorado and most of the pas-
1992]
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The recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scot-
land on December 21, 19887 has once again fueled debate over
the Warsaw Convention." The Lockerbie court made two contro-
versial findings on the award of damages in actions governed by
the Convention. First, the Second Circuit held that punitive
damages were not recoverable under the Warsaw Convention
and that plaintiffs may seek only compensatory damages when
an action is governed by the Convention.' The court reasoned
that to allow punitive damages would prevent the Convention
from achieving its main goal: to limit an air carrier's potential
liability in the event of an accident.10 In addition, the Second
Circuit pointed out that to award punitive damages would hin-
der the creation of a uniform liability scheme."' Second, the
court held that the Warsaw Convention preempted independent
state claims against an airline, making the Convention the exclu-
sive means by which plaintiffs could seek recovery for personal
injuries or wrongful deaths stemming from an international
flight."2 The Lockerbie court reasoned that if independent state
sengers purchased tickets in Idaho). The Convention was also intended to avoid such
complex and arbitrary judicial determinations. See infra notes 14-29 and accompanying
text.
928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
8 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1490-94 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (Mikva, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Lockerbie decision for unnecessarily
concluding that the Convention must be the exclusive cause of action and arguing that
punitive damages should be available under the Convention when the applicable state
law permits); Kelly Compton Grems, Punitive Damages Under the Warsaw Convention:
Revisiting the Drafters' Intent, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 141 (1991) (arguing that the Lockerbie
court erred in looking at the drafters' intent to determine that the Convention was exclu-
sive when the plain language of the Convention permits independent state causes of ac-
tion). For a critique of the Korean Air Lines dissent and a discussion of why the Con-
vention must be the exclusive cause of action, see infra note 210 and accompanying text.
See also Christopher Reynolds, Travel Insiders, What Value Life? Issue Unsettled For
Air Travel, LA TmEs, Aug. 2, 1992, at L2 (the "[Warsaw Convention] does not serve
anyone, whether that be the families of victims, the airlines, or even the trial lawyers
who represent the families.").
9 928 F.2d at 1270.
10 Id. For a discussion of the background of the Warsaw Convention and the inten-
tions of the drafting parties, see infra notes 14-29.
" 928 F.2d at 1269-70.
12 Id. The Second Circuit's decision prevents airline disaster claimants from pursu-
ing punitive damages or wrongful death actions under state law. This Comment views
the Second Circuit's dual holdings as essentially interchangeable, even though other
commentators have criticized the court for deciding both issues. See supra note 8. The
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causes of action were available, the Convention would be unable
to function as a uniform guide to airline liability. 3
This Comment begins with a discussion of the underlying
policies and goals of the Warsaw Convention. This Comment
then discusses the procedural history of the two conflicting dis-
trict court decisions that led to the Second Circuit's review of
the punitive damage issue. Finally, this Comment examines the
Lockerbie court's decision.
This Comment contends that the Second Circuit was justi-
fied in holding that punitive damages are not available under
the Warsaw Convention. After examining the general rationale
for punitive damages and then contrasting this with the role of
damages under the Convention, this Comment concludes that
the penal nature of punitive damage awards in the United States
conflicts with the Convention's purely compensatory structure.
Furthermore, the Comment submits that punitive damages are
both duplicative and unnecessary since the Warsaw Convention
provides for unlimited compensatory awards when willful mis-
conduct can be proved. By the Convention's own terms, victims
in international aviation accidents are adequately compensated
without the imposition of punitive awards. Additionally, the
marketplace, to a certain extent, imposes punitive damages upon
airlines; negative publicity leads to decreased ridership.
Next, this Comment argues that it was necessary for the
Second Circuit in Lockerbie to hold that the Warsaw Conven-
tion preempts independent state claims. Were state claims al-
lowed, consistent application of the Convention would be impos-
sible. Airlines and potential claimants would be faced with a
myriad of potentially conflicting state rules since there is no
state uniformity on such issues as whether punitive damages can
court's holding that punitive damages are unavailable under the Convention is directly
related to its holding that state wrongful death actions are barred by the Convention. A
primary reason for finding that punitive damages are not permitted is the division
among states concerning punitive damage awards in wrongful death actions and the re-
sulting effect on uniform and limited liability judgments. See infra notes 152-74 and
accompanying text. Whether this Comment refers to punitive damages or independent
state causes of action, the surrounding analysis is relevant to both. Independent state
wrongful death claims and punitive damages would both prevent the uniform application
of the Convention. Thus both are barred by the Warsaw Convention. However, this
Comment will also examine the two holdings separately since commentators and courts
have criticized the Second Circuit for unnecessarily preempting all state claims.
13 928 F.2d at 1270.
19921
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
be awarded in a wrongful death action or whether punitive dam-
ages can be insured against. To promote uniformity and to effec-
tuate the Convention's goal of limiting potential liability, the
Second Circuit had no recourse but to preempt the application
of independent state claims seeking punitive damages.
This Comment concludes by examining how the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion squares with those of other jurisdictions which
support the position that independent state claims are pre-
empted by the Warsaw Convention. Ultimately, it is this Com-
ment's position that the Second Circuit's analysis was both
thoughtful and principled and that the Lockerbie court acted in
accordance with the objectives established by the Warsaw
Convention.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
The 1929 Warsaw Convention was the culmination of two
international conferences that sought to lend guidance and assis-
tance to the then infant aviation industry.14 The resulting docu-
ment reflected two primary goals envisioned by the drafters. The
first was the creation of uniform liability principles for the inter-
national airline industry. 5 Uniformity was deemed necessary be-
cause the airline industry involved many nations with different
languages, customs and legal practices. The Convention's draft-
ers wanted one set of rules to apply no matter which nation or
airline was involved in a legal action. 16 In addition, the Conven-
tion established almost complete uniform procedures for dealing
with claims arising out of international transportation and for
determining the substantive law that was to be applied to such
claims.17 The Convention's drafters believed that this uniform
'" See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 498. The first conference was held
in Paris in 1925 and the second in Warsaw in 1929. Id.
15 See Barbara J. Buono, The Recoverability of Punitive Damages Under the War-
saw Convention In Cases of Willful Misconduct: Is the Sky the Limit?, 13 FOJWtHAM
INT'L L.J. 570, 573 (1989-1990) (detailing the drafting history and the resulting text of
the Warsaw Convention).
"6 See Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1090-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
(1977).
17 [Tihe framers of the Convention... [drafted] a treaty which laid down uni-
form rules as to venue (Article 28), burden of proof (Article 20), standards of
negligence (Articles 20 & 25), presumptions (Article 18(3) & 26), contractual
liability limitations (Article 23), suits against the estate of the tortfeasor (Arti-
cle 27), statute of limitations (Article 29), liability in the event of carriage by
[Vol. 58:497
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procedure would simplify and lessen litigation.18
The second goal of the Convention was to limit the poten-
tial liability of air carriers.19 Limiting potential liability was con-
sidered the more important of the two goals and the overriding
purpose of the Warsaw Convention.20 Liability was initially lim-
ited to $8300 but was subsequently raised to $75,000.21 The Con-
vention members imposed a liability limit to enable airlines to
spend needed capital on expanding their operations instead of
paying large liability awards.2 The limit also provided a definite
basis upon which insurance rates could be calculated.23 Addi-
more than one carrier (Article 30), and damage awards (Article 22 & 25).
Id. at 1092. The Convention was also successful in achieving uniformity in the areas of
ticket documentation, baggage checks and air waybills. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 5, at 498.
Is "It is believed that the principle of limitations of liability will ... be beneficial to
passengers ... as affording a more definite basis of recovery and as tending to lessen
litigation." President of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the Unifica-
tion of Certain Rules, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, S. EX-Ec Doc. No. G, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934) (Secretary of State Cordell Hull), cited in Lowenfeld & Men-
delsohn, supra note 5, at 499.
19 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 499.
20 Id.
2' The rise in liability resulted from the Montreal Agreement of 1966. The United
States was dissatisfied with the low level of compensation previously available under the
Warsaw Convention and negotiated an increase to $75,000 after it threatened to with-
draw from the Warsaw Convention. The Montreal Agreement is not a treaty, but rather
is an application of Article 22 of the Convention, which allows air carriers and passengers
to agree upon a higher level of liability. It has been argued that the reason other member
nations agreed to the increase in liability was to keep the United States from withdraw-
ing from the Convention. Without the United States as a member-a major player in
international aviation-it would have been impossible for the Convention to achieve its
goal of uniformity in international travel See Buono, supra note 15, at 579-8O. The
Montreal Agreement is peculiar in that it is not accepted by all members of the Conven-
tion and is therefore not on equal standing with the Warsaw Convention. "The agree-
ment only applies where the place of departure, the place of destination, or an agreed
stopping place is the United States." See Cagle, supra note 3, at 957-59.
22 Nations often engage in restrictive measures such as tariffs or enter into treaties
restricting trade to protect new and developing industries. See JOHN H. JACKSON & WIL-
LLI J. DAVEY, INTERNATIONAL EcONomiC RETivrONS 19 (1986). Often governments will
subsidize industries in an attempt to protect them from competition abroad. Id. at 725-
26. In a sense, the liability limitation of the Warsaw Convention was nothing more than
a communal attempt by various governments to protect the aviation industry. See
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 499. Although the Success of governmental
intrusion into the free market has been debated, the fact remains that it is nonetheless
an accepted practice for nations to attempt to protect domestic industries. JACKSON &
DAVEY, supra, at 17-19.
23 "[S]uch limitation will afford the carrier a more definite and equitable basis on
which to obtain insurance rates ...." President of the United States Transmitting a
1992]
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tionally, the drafters believed that limiting liability would de-
crease the volume of litigation since parties would know the ex-
tent of potential liability before the commencement of a
lawsuit.s4
The Convention established a basic trade off between po-
tential claimants and airlines.25 Initially, the Convention placed
a presumption of liability against the airline in the event of an
accident unless the carrier could prove that it was free from neg-
ligence.2 6 However, airlines can no longer free themselves from a
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rule, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, S.
ExEc. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934) (Secretary of State Cordell Hull), cited
in Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 500.
24 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Whether the Convention has indeed
decreased litigation is another question for which there appears to be no empirical data.
However, it is already clear that the Lockerbie decision is beginning to add some uni-
formity and simplicity to actions governed by the Convention at least insofar as punitive
damages are concerned. In Korean Air Lines the United States District Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia vacated a $50 million punitive damages award based on the
reasoning of Lockerbie. 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Had Lockerbie been decided
before the Korean Air Lines jury award, it is most likely that the award would have been
vacated sooner or never awarded at all. Likewise Judge Cannella of the Southern District
of New York recently denied a plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint to add punitive
damages in an action governed by the Convention, noting the recent Lockerbie decision.
See Priestley v. American Airlines, Inc., No. Civ. 89-8265, 1991 LEXIS 4804 (S.D.N.Y.
April 12, 1991). As the Second Circuit is faced with issues of punitive awards and
whether the Convention affords an exclusive cause of action in international airline dis-
aster suits, Lockerbie will be its lodestar. In time, it is quite likely that the issue will not
be litigated at all.
28 The Lockerbie court focused much of its attention on the influence of civil law in
the drafting of the Convention's provisions. According to the court, the Warsaw Conven-
tion was influenced by the civil law of contracts. In French and German law contractual
liability concerning domestic carriers provides for a trade-off between limitations on lia-
bility and a plaintiff's guaranteed recovery. 928 F.2d at 1271. "Article 25 of the Conven-
tion, which lifts the liability limi[t] . .. [for] willful misconduct ... [is] also derive[d]
from the ... civil law principle that 'one cannot escape the consequences of one's inten-
tional fault.'" Id. Based on these civil law doctrines, the court opined that the Conven-
tion must be read as both a method to establish uniform liability and as a means to limit
such liability.
2 Article 17 of the Convention stated that the carrier would be liable for damages
sustained. Article 20(1) of the Convention established that liability could only be rebut-
ted if the carrier could prove it was free from negligence. Courts had interpreted Articles
17 and 20(1) to create a presumption of airline liability unless the carrier could prove
otherwise. See Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 922 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979). This presumption of liability made establishing liabil-
ity easier and less expensive for claimants seeking recovery under the Convention. "The
principle of placing the burden on the carrier to show lack of negligence in international
air transportation in order to escape liability, seems to be reasonable in view of the diffi-
culty which a [claimant] has in establishing the cause of an accident in air transporta-
[Vol. 58: 497
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Convention claim by arguing that all necessary steps were taken
to avoid the accident or damage. 7 Rather, there now exists a
strict liability standard for accidents, limiting air carrier liability
to $75,000 while claimants benefit from a guaranteed recovery. 8
Despite these liability limits, Article 25 of the Convention pro-
vides that unlimited damages beyond the $75,000 limit can be
awarded if a claimant can prove that the airline engaged in will-
ful misconduct.
29
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF LocKERBi 30
A. Facts and Procedural History of Pan Am Flight 103
On December 21, 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 crashed near
Lockerbie, Scotland. Flight 103 had originated in Frankfurt,
West Germany and had flown nonstop to Heathrow Airport in
London, England.31 The flight then departed Heathrow for New
York's John F. Kennedy International Airport.3 2 At 7:19 p.m.
Greenwich mean time, Flight 103 exploded in midair and
crashed near Lockerbie, Scotland.3 The explosion was caused by
a terrorist bomb placed inside a checked bag in the cargo hold of
tion." Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 500, quoting Message from the Presi-
dent of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, S. EXEc. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1934).
27 Before the Montreal Agreement, airlines could escape liability by proving that all
necessary steps were taken to avoid the accident or damages sustained. See supra note
26 and accompanying text. The parties to the Montreal Agreement, however, waived the
liability defense available under Article 20(1) of the Convention. See Cagle, supra note 3,
at 959. As such, airlines are now strictly liable for damages under the Convention.
28 For a justification of the strict liability standard, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra note 5, at 599-601 (arguing that the standard is justified since strict liability stan-
dards tend to prevent the delay of liability awards and noting that delays seriously de-
value the compensation eventually awarded to claimants). One of the major goals of the
Convention is to decrease litigation and establish predictable awards. Strict liability pro-
motes such goals. See supra notes 14-27 and accompanying text.
29 928 F.2d at 1271. For a discussion of what constitutes willful misconduct, see
supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
"0 The facts of Lockerbie stem from two separate airline incidents. The first case
involved the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The sec-
ond case involved the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 at Karachi International Airport,
Pakistan.





the airplane.3 4 All 259 passengers on board died in the
explosion.35
Representatives of the victims filed suits in various federal
courts against Pan American World Airways, Inc. ("Pan Am"),
two Pan Am subsidiary corporations that provided security ser-
vices and Pan Am's parent corporation." The plaintiffs asserted
that federal courts had jurisdiction over Pan Am based on fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction and the Warsaw Convention.3 7
The plaintiffs asserted claims against Pan Am seeking compen-
satory damages for the airline's willful misconduct and breach of
contract. The plaintiffs also sought punitive damages for the de-
fendant's willful misconduct.3 ' If willful misconduct could be es-
tablished, such claims would entitle the plaintiffs to unlimited
liability awards. All actions were subsequently consolidated and
transferred for pretrial hearings by order of the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation to the Eastern District of New
York."e
Defendant Pan Am moved for partial summary judgment
' Brief for Appellant at 2, In re Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-
7388).
31 733 F. Supp. at 549.
" Specifically, the suit was filed against Pan Am, Pan Am Corp. (Pan Am's parent
corporation) and two companies that provided security services for Pan Am (Alert Man-
agement, Inc. and Pan Am World Services, Inc.). Id. Pan Am moved to dismiss the puni-
tive damage claims. 928 F.2d at 1269. When this Comment refers to Pan Am, it refers to
Pan American World Airways, Inc.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants original jurisdiction to federal courts in all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. Since the Warsaw
Convention is a treaty to which the United States is a signatory, district courts had
jurisdiction over the Lockerbie claims.
733 F. Supp. at 549. The plaintiffs asserted that the Warsaw Convention provided
that the punitive damage issue should be determined according to the law of the forum
state. Id. Therefore punitive damages could be barred only if local law prohibited the
awarding of such damages. Id. The plaintiffs also claimed that Article 25 of the Conven-
tion, which allows for the lifting of the $75,000 liability limit, authorized punitive dam-
age awards if willful misconduct is established. Id. While it is not clear which of Pan
Am's acts were alleged to constitute willful misconduct, the plaintiffs' claim undoubtedly
stemmed from Pan Am's violations of established security standards. See Brief for Ap-
pellant at 4 n.7, In re Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7388).
" In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, 709 F. Supp. 231
(J.P.M.L. 1989). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation was created to consoli-
date and assign to a single judge common litigation that is ongoing in multiple jurisdic-
tions. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1992). Initially, the Panel must determine whether various cases
pending throughout the country have enough in common to justify their consolidation.
The end goal is to reduce expenses and expedite dispositions. See Benjamins v. British
European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
[Vol. 58:497
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on the plaintiffs' punitive damage claims by arguing that such
damages were barred under the Warsaw Convention. ° Chief
Judge Platt for the Eastern District of New York granted the
defendants' partial summary judgment motion and dismissed
the punitive damage claims.41 The court rejected the plaintiffs'
assertion that local law governed whether punitive damages
could be awarded under the Warsaw Convention and reasoned
that to allow punitive damages would be inconsistent with the
primary goals of the Convention.4 2 Although the Warsaw Con-
vention was silent on whether punitive damages could be
awarded, the court concluded that "in order for a court to find
that a provision inconsistent with the entire scheme of the War-
saw Convention exists, the provision would have to be express
and explicit. ' 43 While the court acknowledged that the liability
limits set by the Convention were low, it nevertheless reasoned
that it was bound not to alter, amend or add to the Convention's
text because such an act would be a usurpation of legislative
power."
On February 26, 1990 Chief Judge Platt entered an addi-
tional memorandum and order denying the plaintiffs' motion for
reargument.45 The court found, however, that the punitive dam-
40 In re Lockerbie, 733 F. Supp. 547, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 549-50.
43 Id. at 550. See also Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989)
(holding that punitive damages are inconsistent with the intent and language of the
Warsaw Convention), reo'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991). The district court
did not believe that the drafters of the Convention intended for punitive damages to be
recoverable. "The primary shared expectation of the contracting parties was to set some
uniform limit on an airline carrier's liability in order to promote the civil aviation indus-
try which at the time of the Warsaw Convention was in its infancy." Locherbie, 733 F.
Supp. at 550. "[A] State cause of action for punitive damages would directly contravene
the liability limits set out in the treaty." Id. at 551 (citing Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1480-81).
At the time the Convention was signed, laws governing punitive damages varied from
nation to nation. If the drafters of the Convention intended to create a uniform liability
scheme, they would not have allowed for the application of inconsistent local rules. Id. at
552. For a discussion of commentators who have criticized examining the goals of the
Convention as a basis for interpreting the Convention's text, see infra note 85 and ac-
companying text.
4 733 F. Supp. at 553-54, citing Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989)
(discussing the standards for interpreting the Convention in the context of whether air
carriers lost the protection of the Warsaw Convention's limitation on damages if the
airline failed to provide notice of the limitation in 10-point type print size).




age issue involved a controlling question of law and subse-
quently granted the plaintiffs' motion to take an interlocutory
appeal of the issue to the Second Circuit.46 The Second Circuit
agreed to hear the appeal on April 27, 1990.4 7
B. Facts and Procedural History of Pan Am Flight 73
The In re Hijacking of Pan Am World Airways at Karachi
International Airport, Pakistan on Sept. 5, 198648 case arose
from a terrorist hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 traveling from
Bombay, India to New York on September 5, 1986. At a sched-
uled stop in Karachi, Pakistan, four armed terrorists seized the
aircraft. Twenty passengers were killed and a number of other
" 928 F.2d at 1269. The interlocutory appeal was made under the Interlocutory Ap-
peals Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). The Act governs interlocutory appeals that may be
heard upon judicial discretion. The section applies where: (1) the district judge who au-
thorized the interlocutory appeal is "of the opinion that such an order involves a control-
ling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion..."
and also believes that "an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation .. ." and (2) the court of appeals then agrees to
hear the case. The determination of whether to certify the issue for appeal is at the
complete discretion of the district court judge. RICHARD L. MARcus Er AL., CIVIL PROCE-
DURE: A MODERN APPROACH 898-902 (1989).
" Brief for Appellant at 5, In re Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-
7388). The remaining liability issues continued to be tried in the Eastern District of New
York. Recently, after an 11-week trial, the jury found that Pan Am had acted willfully in
failing to maintain proper security measures. This decision cleared the way for plaintiffs
to collect unlimited damages from Pan Am. Arnold H. Lubasch, Pan Am Is Held Liable
By Jury in '88 Explosion, N.Y. TIMEs, July 11, 1992, at Al. Plaintiffs are seeking a total
of $350 million in damages. Pan Am Guilty of Misconduct in Lockerbie Disaster, Jury
Rules, CRAIN Bus. INS., July 13, 1992, at 1. The trials to determine damages began in July
1992 and verdicts have been issued including one in excess of $9 million. Edward Frost,
First Lockerbie Damage Award-$9.23 Million, REUTERS, LTD., July 22, 1992. Since Pan
Am is now bankrupt and liquidated, Pan Am's insurers will cover the jury awards.
USAIG Expected Warsaw Limit to Apply to Pan Am, CRAIN Bus. INS., July 22, 1992, at
14. However, it is not entirely clear what effect Pan Am's bankruptcy will have on the
insurance companies ability to pay claims. To ensure payment of damage awards, the
plaintiffs have motioned Judge Platt to order the insurers to post a $750 million bond.
See Sara J. Harty, Pan Am Plaintiffs Seek Bond From Insurers, CRAIN Bus. INS., Oct.
26, 1992, at 82. Nevertheless, these awards greatly surpass the $75,000 Warsaw Conven-
tion liability limit. The argument that the Warsaw Convention does not adequately com-
pensate victims is severely weakened when juries award these large compensatory
awards. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. Additionally, whether intended or
not, a jury award in excess of $9 million undoubtedly sends a message to airlines to
maintain adequate safety standards or face excessive potential liability. In fact, the lia-
bility award for over $9 million is the largest award in aviation disaster history. See Pan
Am Award is Largest in Disaster History, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 3, 1992, at 6.
" 729 F. Supp. 17, 18 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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passengers were injured during the course of the hijacking.40
Survivors and representatives of the Karachi hijacking vic-
tims sued Pan Am in various federal district courts. The actions
were consolidated in the Southern District of New York by order
of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. The plaintiffs
asserted that Pan Am had engaged in willful misconduct and
they sought both compensatory and punitive damages.5 1 Pan Am
responded with a summary judgment motion seeking the dismis-
sal of all claims relating to punitive damages.2 Judge Sprizzo
denied Pan Am's motion for partial summary judgment.5 3
The court reasoned that there was no express language in
the Convention that preempted or precluded punitive dam-
ages. " The court found that the only limitation on damages was
Article 22 of the Convention under which damage awards could
not exceed $75,000 unless willful misconduct was established.5
The court also reasoned that preemption of state punitive dam-
age claims could not be inferred in the absence of some clear
indication in the text itself that the Convention prohibited puni-
tive damage awards.58 The court interpreted the language of the
Convention to provide expressly for the award of punitive dam-
ages.57 The court understood Article 25's lifting of liability to
49 Id.
50 The actions were consolidated and transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1992). See
supra note 39.
51 In re Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267, 1269 (2d Cir. 1991).
52 729 F. Supp. at 18.
53 Id.
5 Id. at 19.
55 Id.
" Id. Both parties agreed that the Convention's text is silent on whether punitive
damages are available and that the legislative history sheds little light on the question.
Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1280.
57 729 F. Supp. at 19-20. The district court found that both Articles 24 and 25 of the
Convention envisioned the awarding of punitive damages. Article 24(1) provides that
"any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions
and limits set out in this convention." The court reasoned that this language strongly
suggested that the Convention provided for state causes of action, including those for
punitive damages. Id. at 19. To buttress this analysis, the court put forward Article 25,
which provides that "the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of
this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his villful
misconduct ..... The court opined that to the extent that the Convention limits liabil-
ity, Article 25 removes all limitations on the amount or type of damages to be awarded in
the case of willful misconduct. Id. at 20.
This holding is in sharp contrast to the manner in which the Locherbie district court
read Article 25. There, the court determined that "Article 25 [could) not be interpreted
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include all types of damage awards, including punitive dam-
ages.5 8 Since the language of the Convention clearly indicated to
the court that punitive damages could be awarded, the court did
not find it necessary to analyze the implied unwritten intentions
of the original contracting members.5 9 Judge Sprizzo, like Chief
as authorizing an independent cause of action for punitive damage claims and be consis-
tent with the shared expectations of the parties" to the Convention. In re Lockerbie, 733
F. Supp. 547, 551-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). See infra note 85 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the Second Circuit's statutory analysis of the Convention's text). See supra notes 14-
29 and accompanying text (discussing the drafters' intent).
58 729 F. Supp. at 20.
19 Id. In fact, the Karachi court believed that the courts in In re Lockerbie, 733 F.
Supp. at 547, and Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1483-89 (11th Cir. 1989),
were incorrect when they examined the intentions of the parties in formulating the Con-
vention. Id. Its principal disagreement with these decisions was the method of statutory
interpretation adopted by the Lockerbie and Floyd courts. In Chan v. Korean Airlines,
Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989), the Supreme Court enunciated basic rules by which to inter-
pret the Convention.
We must.., be governed by the text-solemnly adopted by the governments
of many separate nations-whatever conclusions might be drawn from the in-
tricate drafting history .... The latter may of course be consulted to elucidate
a text that is ambiguous ... [b]ut where the text is clear ... [courts] have no
power to insert an amendment.
Id. at 134 (citations omitted). The Karachi court believed that the language of Articles
24 and 25 was clear in permitting punitive damage awards. See infra notes 110-27 and
accompanying text (discussing Articles 24 and 25 and criticizing the analysis adopted by
the Karachi court). To the Karachi court, Article 24 clearly provided that local law could
determine whether punitive awards were available and Article 25 provided for the lifting
of all liability limitations, including the prohibition on punitive damages. Therefore
there was no need to examine the drafters' intent under the analysis formulated in the
Chan decision.
The Lockerbie district court, the Eleventh Circuit in Floyd and the Second Circuit
in Lockerbie did not view the text as reading as clearly as the Karachi district court.
Initially, these courts noted that the Convention was silent on the issue of punitive dam-
ages. 733 F. Supp. at 549 ("the Warsaw Convention does not expressly refer to punitive
damage claims ... "); 872 F.2d at 1486 ("[T]he text of the Convention does not explic-
itly address the issue of punitive damages .... [W]e do not think plaintiffs can take
much comfort in this 'silence.' "); 928 F.2d at 1270 ("[Tlhe Convention is silent on this
subject [of punitive damages]."). Therefore, with ambiguous text to interpret, the courts
understood that they had no choice but to determine the drafters' intent in resolving the
punitive damage issue. Additionally, as the Second Circuit itself noted, the literal mean-
ing of Article 24 is not clear. 928 F.2d at 1282 (stating that Article 24 is subject to two
interpretations).
However, it is harder to justify these courts' interpretations of Article 25. The Lock-
erbie courts and the Floyd court do not appear to argue that Article 25 is ambiguous and
thus subject to a legislative intent inquiry. Instead they reasoned that Article 25 was
intended to apply to the lifting of limitations on compensatory awards only, even though
a literal reading might yield a different conclusion. See 733 F. Supp. at 552 ("It seems
more likely that if the . . . [drafters] intended that carriers . . . would be subject to
punitive damage claims, Article 25 would have provided that the entire Warsaw Conven-
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Judge Platt in Pan Am Flight 103, certified his decision for
appeal.6 0
C. The Second Circuit's Review of Lockerbie
The court of appeals examined the conflicting lower court
decisions as raising a single question of law.01 The issue was
whether a plaintiff may assert a claim for punitive damages in a
wrongful death action governed by the Warsaw Convention. 2
The Second Circuit found the Convention to be silent on the
issue. 3 Nonetheless, the court was persuaded that the Conven-
tion's purposes were not consistent with an award of punitive
damages." The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the Eastern
District's dismissal of the plaintiffs' punitive damage claims aris-
ing from the crash of Pan Am Flight 103 and reversed the
Southern District's denial of the defendants' summary judgment
motion to strike the punitive damage claims arising from the hi-
jacking of Pan Am Flight 73.65
tion, rather than just certain provisions [namely, compensatory damage provisions], were
inapplicable.. . ."); 928 F.2d at 1286 ("[W]hen the Convention refers to the terms that
limit or exclude liability, it refers solely to terms within the Convention itself, as con-
ceived by the contracting parties."); 872 F.2d at 1483 ("The structure of the Convention.
(. [and] the subsequent interpretation by the parties... persuade us that Article 25
operates only to remove liability limitations" for compensatory damages.). Since these
decisions did not conclude that Article 25 was ambiguous, then under the Supreme
Court's instructions in Chan it is questionable wbether these courts should have ex-
amined the legislative intent behind Article 25. However, these courts cannot be criti-
cized for refusing to adopt a reading of the Convention that would severely undermine
the universally accepted goals of limited liability and uniformity. For a discussion of why
the Second Circuit was justified in examining the drafters' intent, see infra note 85.
60 In re Karachi, No. MDL-724 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1990) (order certifying punitive
damage issue for immediate appeal to the Second Circuit). Judge Sprizzo determined
that his Karachi decision to allow punitive damage claims to proceed involved a control-
ling question of law for which there existed a substantial difference of opinion. In fact,
Judge Sprizzo's decision directly conflicted with the decision of Judge Platt.
"1 In re Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267, 1269 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991).
62 Id. at 1269-70.
63 The Second Circuit also noted that there was little legislative history discussing
the types of damages that could be awarded under the Convention. Id. at 1270. In fact,
both Pan Am and the various plaintiff-appellants agreed that the notes and minutes of
the Warsaw Convention provided little guidance in determining whether the Convention
provides for punitive damages. Id. at 1280. With little else to analyze other than the text
itself, the Lockerbie court had no real option but to examine the issue in light of how
punitive damage awards would affect the Convention's goals. For a discussion of other
methods the court might have adopted in examining the Convention, see supra note 85.




The Second Circuit undertook a lengthy, if not exactly se-
quential, analysis to support its position that punitive damages
were not available under the Warsaw Convention. 8 It focused
on the role of punitive damages in American law, noting that
under state law, punitive damages are generally imposed to pun-
ish a defendant. The court acknowledged that punitive damages
are sometimes awarded to compensate a plaintiff for injuries
that would not otherwise be compensated through traditional
tort awards. 7 Under federal law, however, punitive damages are
66 Initially the court discussed the Convention's history and the objectives the draft-
ers desired to achieve. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text (discussing the
goals of the Warsaw Convention). The Second Circuit acknowledged the drafters' con-
cerns that uniformity in procedure and limited liability were "necessary to allow airlines
to raise the capital needed to expand operations and to provide a definite basis upon
which ... insurance rates could be calculated." 928 F.2d at 1270-71. It also recognized
that the drafters hoped to bring about a decrease in the length, complexity and cost of
airline litigation. Id. However, the Second Circuit addressed these concerns as an after-
thought in its section on policy considerations. See 928 F.2d at 1287-88. Nonetheless, the
Lockerbie court was correct in determining that these goals would be promoted by the
preemption of punitive damage claims. See infra notes 139-79 and accompanying text
(discussing the effects of permitting independent state claims); see infra notes 77 & 85
(examining the organizational quirks of the Lockerbie decision).
This Comment's approach differs from the analysis undertaken by the Second Cir-
cuit. This Comment justifies preempting all state claims by determining that the Con-
vention does not provide for punitive awards. The Comment then notes that if state law
claims are permitted under the Convention, punitive damages could be asserted under
state laws and uniform application of the Convention would be impossible. Finally, it
concludes that to prevent this back door disruption to the Convention, all state law
claims must be preempted. The Second Circuit, however, determines that state law
claims are preempted by the Convention apart from considering the effect punitive dam-
ages would have on the Convention. The Second Circuit examines the two issues as if
they were separate. Perhaps the Lockerbie decision would unfold more logically if the
court had engaged in a detailed analysis of the effect that state law claims would have on
the Convention.
61 928 F.2d at 1272. The Second Circuit noted that the role of punitive damages in
state law continues to be divided and that a minority of states still interpret punitive
damages to serve a compensatory function. See Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 242 N.W.
2d 775, 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (stating that the purpose of punitive damages is not to
punish but to fully compensate plaintiffs for injuries sustained); Kelsey v. Connecticut
State Employees Ass'n, 427 A.2d 420, 425 (Conn. 1980) (permitting punitive damages to
be awarded to cover litigation costs because of the defendant's reckless behavior). To
add to this inconsistency, there are even states that take the position that punitive dam-
ages serve both a compensatory and penal role. See Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d
393, 397 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing that "New York courts view punitive damages as
having a purpose beyond punishment, affording the injured party a personal monetary
recovery over and above compensatory loss"). Therefore, if New York State law applied
under the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiffs in Lockerbie and Karachi might have been
able to proceed with a punitive damage claim even if such claims were preempted be-
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generally awarded only to punish a defendant and deter future
conduct.68 Therefore, if state law claims were preempted by the
Convention, punitive damages could only be awarded if the Con-
vention was designed to punish airlines in addition to compen-
sating victims."'
The court next analyzed the potential problems that would
be created by allowing independent state claims seeking punitive
damages.70 The Second Circuit concluded that the Convention
did not provide for independent state causes of action, even
though no Second Circuit decision had directly held that the
Convention created an exclusive cause of action.7 1 The court
cause New York law views punitive awards as both compensatory and penal in nature.
Since Article 25 lifts liability limits on compensatory damages, arguably unlimited puni-
tive awards could be sanctioned under New York law because of the award's dual role.
See Racich, 887 F.2d at 393. The Second Circuit, seeing that merely preempting punitive
damage claims might not prevent them from being awarded under state law in the guise
of compensatory damage claims, determined that it had to preempt all state claims.
928 F.2d at 1272. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (discussing the
proper role of punitive damages).
" 928 F.2d at 1273.
70 Id.
71 Id. The court cited In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14,
1980, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983) and Tokio Marine & Fire
Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980) as Second Circuit cases
addressing the issue of exclusivity. In Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland the Second
Circuit affirmed on other grounds the district court's holding that the Warsaw Conven-
tion was the exclusive cause of action. The appellate decision however did not address
the issue of exclusivity itself but instead examined whether an airline lost the protection
of the Convention's liability limitations if it did not adhere to the 10-point type size in
warning passengers of the limitations. See supra note 2.
In the Poland district court holding, the court clearly stated that the Warsaw Con-
vention creates an exclusive cause of action. 535 F. Supp. 833, 844-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
"[T]he Warsaw Convention specifically controls and exclusively governs any and all
claims for damages arising out of the death or injury of a passenger engaged in interna-
tional air transportation, and plaintiffs can not maintain a separate wrongful death ac-
tion for damages under California law." Id. The opinion went on to state that the "limi-
tation of liability of a carrier would have no meaning if this exclusivity argument were
rejected and plaintiffs were permitted to assert independent causes of action under
[state] law." Id. While this district court opinion is not binding on the Second Circuit, it
is difficult to understand why the Lockerbie court examined the appellate opinion in
Poland, which does not address the issue of exclusivity, but ignored the district court
opinion which does examine the question.
A Second Circuit case with a conflicting view on exclusivity is Tokio Marine & Fire
Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980). The Tokio decision
revolved around the crash of a McDonnell Douglas aircraft owned by Japan Air Lines in
Moscow. The issues presented involved contribution and indemnification. The Warsaw
Convention was not directly implicated. However, in dicta, the Tokio court stated that
the Convention might not be the exclusive cause of action:
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buttressed its position by citing to cases in the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits which held that the Convention was the exclusive cause
of action for international aviation accidents.7  The court
Article 24 of the Convention provides that any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits of the Con-
vention. If... the Convention draftsmen intended to create a contract cause of
action, the above [language] indicates that they did not intend that cause of
action to be exclusive.
Id. at 942 (citations omitted). However, Tokio stated that the issue remained open
whether the Convention was grounded in the common law of contract or tort. Id. The
Second Circuit in Lockerbie directly addressed the issue and determined that although
the Convention was drafted against the civil law of contracts, the Convention's structure
was much more similar to common law tort than to the common law of contracts. 928
F.2d at 1279-80; see infra note 76. Consequently, it is not clear whether the Tokio court
would still state that the Convention was not intended to be the exclusive cause of action
in light of the Lockerbie court's determination that the Convention is based on common
tort law.
Additionally, the Tokio court did not undertake an examination of the potential
ramifications if the Convention was not the exclusive cause of action. For a discussion of
the ramifications of independent state claims, see infra notes 139-79 and accompanying
text. The Tokio court did not interpret the Convention, but was instead faced with de-
termining whether a contract provision prevented an insurance company from recovering
from the airline for settled claims arising from a plane crash. Subsequently, the Lock-
erbie holding is both better reasoned and substantiated since it directly addresses the
issue of exclusivity and engages in a detailed analysis of the Convention's text.
Interestingly, it was not until 1978 that the Second Circuit recognized that the War-
saw Convention created an independent cause of action at all. See Benjamins v. British
European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
Before Benjamins the Convention was viewed as a standard by which to impose liability
but was not seen as creating a cause of action to commence a lawsuit. 572 F.2d at 916.
The Lockerbie court concluded that Benjamins left open the question of whether state
causes of action were available under the Convention. For a further discussion of the
Benjamins decision and an analysis of the Second Circuit's treatment of the exclusivity
issue, see infra note 186.
72 See Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984) (Warsaw Convention creates a cause of action and is
the exclusive remedy for loss of or damage to cargo), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985);
In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983)(Warsaw
Convention creates a cause of action but not necessarily the exclusive cause of action).
For further discussion of the Second Circuit's interpretation of the Fifth and Ninth Cir-
cuits' decisions, see infra notes 186-200 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit also
found persuasive the manner in which other members of the Convention have treated
the issue of exclusivity. 928 F.2d at 1274. The Lockerbie court found that France, Eng-
land, Canada and Australia all have held the Convention to be the exclusive remedy for
claims governed by the Warsaw Convention. Id. Holding that the Warsaw Convention is
the exclusive remedy has the same effect as determining that the Convention is the ex-
clusive cause of action. See infra note 187. The court noted that the manner in which
other nations have interpreted the Warsaw Convention was entitled to considerable
weight. Id. See Carriage by Air Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, ch. 36, § 1(4) (Eng.) (Article 17
is the exclusive remedy in actions governed by the Convention); Civil Aviation Act, 1959-
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adopted the posture that allowing separate causes of action
would lead to varying degrees of recovery and therefore would
not serve the Convention's uniform liability objective.7 3 Specifi-
cally, the court indicated that permitting state claims could lead
to the inconsistent application of state law to the same accident.
Since different state laws might apply to different plaintiffs, in-
consistent outcomes would occur.74 Therefore, the Second Cir-
cuit determined that the Warsaw Convention preempted all
state claims since their application would contravene the Con-
vention's uniform liability scheme.75
The court then focused its attention on whether state or
federal law should determine whether punitive damages were
available under the Convention. Considering its previous analy-
sis of the drawbacks of allowing state law to apply, the court
concluded that federal common law should determine the ques-
tion. The Second Circuit concluded that federal common law
would not permit an award of punitive damages if the Warsaw
Convention was designed specifically to compensate
passengers. 5
1973, § 12(2), 2 AUSTL ACTS P. 643, 645 (1974)(AustL); Carriage By Air Act. § 2(5),
Can. Rev, Stat., ch. C-26 (1979) (Can.). See also Benjamins, 572 F.2d at 919 (acimowl-
edging that other nations' interpretations of the Convention's provisions should be given
considerable weight in analyzing the Convention).
One judge has postulated that the fact that other nations have needed to enact legis-
lation requiring the Convention to be the exclusive remedy is proof that the Convention
itself was not intended to be exclusive. See In re Korean Air Line3 Disaster, 932 F.2d
1475, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Mikva, J., dissenting). While this argument has some appeal,
it fails to realize that these nations would not have enacted such legislation if they be-
lieved it was in such contradiction to the Convention's language. To have done so would
have violated the Convention's terms and misconstrued accepted principles of interpret-
ing international agreements. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
22, 1969, § 3, Art. 31(1), reprinted in JOSEPH SWEENEY r AL., THE INThERNA 0.oAL LEGAL
SYsTEM 247 (1988) (documentary supplement), "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its objects and purpose." Therefore, in legislatively
adopting the issue of exclusivity, these nations must have been doing so in the good faith
belief that the Convention had so permitted.
7' In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267, 1275-78.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1278.
7' Although courts often craft federal common law by borrowing relevant state law,
the Second Circuit chose to establish a uniform federal law anew. A primary considera-
tion in determining whether federal courts should create federal law or adopt preexisting
state law is the degree of need for national uniformity. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (federal common law adopted instead of state law be-
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The Second Circuit therefore turned its attention to the
text of the Warsaw Convention.77 Since the Convention is silent
on the issue of what damages might be recovered, the court rec-
ognized that it had to "examine the purposes for which the Con-
vention came into being, its history, the negotiations leading to
its adoption, and how the contracting parties have construed the
Convention. ' '78 Other courts have interpreted provisions of the
Convention to effectuate the Convention's goals of creating a
uniform liability scheme and limiting an air carrier's potential
liability.79 Therefore, in interpreting the question of whether pu-
cause of the need to establish a uniform standard for parties dealing in commercial paper
issued by the federal government). The Second Circuit concluded that only a uniform
federal standard on punitive damages would allow the Convention to maintain a uniform
liability scheme. The court declined to adopt state law since it already concluded that
applying state law in determining whether punitive damages were available would thwart
the Convention's goals. 928 F.2d at 1278-80.
The Lockerbie court examined what type of federal common law should be applied.
Although it recognized that the Convention was drafted under the civil law of contract,
the court concluded that the federal common law of tort would determine which ele-
ments of a cause of action were available under the Convention. The court understood
the common and civil laws of contract to fulfill different roles, while the common law of
tort and the civil law of contract of carriage were comparable. Common tort and civil
contract carriage laws were designed to compensate the victim whereas the common law
of contract was designed to give the plaintiff the benefit of its bargain. Id. at 1279-80.
Under the federal common law of tort, punitive damages can be awarded only to punish
a defendant and deter certain types of conduct. It does not allow for punitive damages to
be compensatory in nature. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S.
299, 306 & n.9 (1986) ("Damages in tort cases are designed to provide compensation for
the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant... Congress adopted this common-
law system of recovery when it established liability for constitutional torts."). Since the
Convention paralleled the federal common law of tort, the Second Circuit concluded that
the Convention would permit the recovery of punitive damages only if the Convention
were drafted with the intent to punish international carriers and deter future types of
behavior. By contrast, if the Convention was designed to be purely compensatory in na-
ture, punitive damages would not be available. In the end, the Second Circuit found the
Convention to be compensatory in nature only and therefore held that the federal com-
mon law of tort would not permit punitive damages to be awarded under the
Convention.
77 Interestingly, as the court itself notes, a judicial examination of a treaty would
normally begin with the text of the treaty itself and then turn to an examination of the
Convention's goals. 928 F.2d at 1280. Here, however, the court first examined the under-
lying goals of the Convention. It was only after the court had determined the Conven-
tion's goals that it determined whether the Convention's text supported a finding pre-
empting punitive damages. 928 F.2d at 1280-87. However, since the Second Circuit's
approach enlightens courts in analyzing the Convention, the court should not be chas-
tised for misordering the traditional interpretative framework.
Id. at 1280.
= See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985) (in interpreting the Convention's
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nitive damages are available under the Convention, the Second
Circuit asked itself whether awarding punitive damages would
effectuate the Convention's goals. Under such a framework the
Lockerbie court concluded that punitive damages were not avail-
able under the Warsaw Convention. 0
The court separately examined Convention Article 17 (es-
tablishing an air carrier's liability), Article 24 (leaving certain is-
sues to be determined by local law) and Article 25 (providing for
the lifting of liability limits in the case of willful misconduct). In
each instance the Lockerbie court determined that the Warsaw
Convention served a compensatory function only.8' The Second
text, words should be given a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the
contracting parties); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475,
1487 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that Article 17 of the Convention is purely compensatory in
function, a reading that comports with the court's obligation to construe the Convention
in a manner that will promote uniformity), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 616 (1991); Floyd v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1487 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that punitive dam-
ages serve a very different role than compensatory awards and that such a conclusion is
supported by the Convention's goals to limit airline liability and to provide a uniform
scheme of liability), reu'd on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991); Reed v. Wiser, 555
F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir.) (interpreting the Convention should begin by examining the
purposes of the provision that requires interpretation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977);
Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 336 (5th Cir. 1967) (a judicial
examination is "hardly possible without considering the conception, parturition, and
growth of the [C]onvention."), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
928 F.2d at 1281.
81 The court examined Articles 24 and 25 of the Convention to determine whether
they provided for punitive awards even though the court had concluded that Article 17
established liability for compensatory damages only. See infra notes 82 & 100-109 (dis-
cussing Article 17). For the text of Articles 24 and 25, see infra notes 110 & 119. The
plaintiffs had argued that Article 24 specifically leaves questions on damages to be deter-
mined by local law since the language of Article 24 directs courts to turn to local law. 928
F.2d at 1282. However, the Second Circuit understood Article 24 to leave only certain
issues to local law such as the amount of damages available--subject to the S75,000
limit-and issues of standing to sue. Id. at 1283-84. The Locherbie court admitted that
Article 24 could be interpreted to provide for independent causes of action, but noted
that it could also be interpreted as establishing Article 17 as the exclusive liability theory
for actions within the Convention's scope. Id. at 1282. Since the language was ambigu-
ous, the Second Circuit was able to delve into the legislative history in accordance with
the Supreme Court's directive in Chan. See supra note 59 & infra note 85 (discussing
Chan). Upon an examination of legislative history, the Second Circuit determined that
Article 24 did not provide for alternative causes of action, but instead established Article
17 as the exclusive cause of action, with only certain issues left to local law determina-
tion. Id. at 1282-85; see infra notes 110-18 and accompanying text (discussing why the
drafters of Article 24 could not have intended the Convention to provide for independent
causes of action).
The Second Circuit also examined whether Article 25 permitted punitive damages
when it lifted the $75,000 liability limit upon a finding of willful misconduct. The plain-
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Circuit reached this conclusion because the treaty was drafted in
language which suggests that the Convention was designed solely
to compensate passengers and not to punish airlines.82
In addition to the Convention's text, the court examined va-
rious policy considerations to determine that punitive damages
were not available under the Convention. The court examined
the effect punitive damages would have on other Convention
members, on air carriers' ability to insure against damages, on
the cost of obtaining such insurance and on the desire to de-
crease and quicken the flow of litigation."' In each category the
Second Circuit believed that to allow punitive damages would
weaken and undermine the Convention's goals of establishing a
uniform liability scheme and limiting airline liability. 4 These
tiffs argued that Article 25 lifts all liability limits, including Article 17's prohibition of
punitive awards. 928 F.2d at 1285. The Lockerbie court concluded that Article 25 re-
ferred to the lifting of compensatory limits only. Id. This conclusion was premised on the
court's prior determination that the Convention was designed as a vehicle to compensate
and not to punish. Id; see infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text (analyzing Article
25).
s' The Convention was originally drafted in French. The Second Circuit's determi-
nation that the Warsaw Convention serves only a compensatory function revolved
around the translation of various French terms embodied in the treaty. Article 17 estab-
lishes the scope of an airline's liability. Specifically, the court's examination focused on
Article 17's use of the term "dommage survenu." 928 F.2d at 1280-82; see infra note 100
(for the text of Article 17). The court adopted the term "damages sustained" as a trans-
lation for "dommage survenu". Id. at 1281. "Damages sustained" suggests that the Con-
vention was designed to compensate only those damages actually sustained by a passen-
ger. Id. By definition, punitive damages are not sustained by a passenger, but are
awarded to punish a defendant. 928 F.2d at 1280-81. The plaintiff-appellants argued that
the term should be translated as "damages occurred" or "arrived" or "happened." Even
had the court adopted such a translation, it would still not justify an award of punitive
damages since such damages are external to the accident itself and have no relation to
the damages incurred, arrived or happened by passengers. Id. at 1280-82.
In support of this analysis, the Lockerbie court noted that in the two other cases in
which courts have interpreted the term, "dommage survenu" was determined to mean
"damages sustained" and was interpreted as compensatory in tone, See Floyd v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1486 (11th Cir. 1989) (the term "dommage survenu" or
"damages sustained" is entirely compensatory in tone), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S.
Ct. 1489 (1991); In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland, 684 F. Supp. 927,
931 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (the proper translation of "dommage survenu" is damages sus-
tained). See infra notes 100-09 and accompanying text (discussing Article 17),
83 928 F.2d at 1287-88.
14 Id. For instance, the Second Court worried that if punitive damages were availa-
ble under the Convention, the United States would become "a magnet so that every
airline injury claim would, if possible, be brought in the United States." Id. at 1287. The
court noted the enormous differences between the recoveries available in the United
States compared to those abroad. If all claims were filed in the United States in hopes ol
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considerations reinforced, the court concluded that the Warsaw
Convention precluded punitive damages.
M.I. ANALYSIS
This Comment initially investigates the function of punitive
damages in American law and contrasts the role of punitive
damages with the intended purposes of the Convention. It be-
comes apparent that the drafters of the Convention did not in-
tend punitive damages to be awarded. To support this conclu-
sion, this Comment looks at the various problems that would
arise if punitive damage claims were permitted. Finally, this
Comment examines whether the Second Circuit was in line with
other jurisdictions and thus advanced the goal of uniformity or
whether it unnecessarily complicated future judicial interpreta-
tions of the Warsaw Convention. In the end, this Comment con-
cludes that preempting state punitive damage claims will pro-
mote the Convention's function as a uniform liability scheme of
air carrier liability. Only by giving the drafters' goals short shrift
could the Second Circuit have concluded otherwise.ss
winning a substantial punitive award and a percentage of such claims were successful,
the Convention would no longer operate as a limiting factor on airline liability. Id. For a
further discussion of the policy issues addressed by the court, including issues of insur-
ance and complexity of litigation, see infra notes 152-74 and accompanying text.
8 The Second Circuit has been criticized for relying so heavily on the drafters in-
tent. See supra note 8. Some commentators argue that courts should never endeavor to
ascertain legislative intent and should only focus on the text before them.
In general, little legislative history is helpfully relevant. Much of it is unrelia-
ble or unreliably revealed. Most if not all of it is of questionable practical
availability .... Besides, little or none of it is relied on by typical members of
the legislative audience as conditioning the language of the statute.
Reed Dickerson, The Legislative Process: Statutory Interpretation: Dipping Into Legis-
lative Intent, 11 HoFSTRA L. Rav. 1125, 1130 (1983). In fact, this theory of statutory
interpretation was adopted by the Supreme Court in Chan: "We must thus be governed
by the text ... whatever conclusions might be drawn from the intricate drafting history.
." 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989).
Yet the Convention's scant legislative history is nonetheless clear and has been a
fertile source for courts that have examined the Warsaw Convention. See supra notes 14-
29 & 79. To ignore and forego a judicial analysis of legislative intent is to jeopardize
unnecessarily the goals for which the treaty was drafted. In this instance to ignore the
drafters' intent and to hold punitive damages available under the Convention would be
to open the treaty to inconsistent application and to create a surge in the level of inter-
national liability awards. See infra notes 139-79 and accompanying text. These are ex-
actly the problems the Convention was designed to prevent.
Additionally, in analyzing an international treaty, principles of statutory interpreta-
tion have developed that urge nations to interpret an international agreement in light of
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A. Punitive Damages Should Not Be Available Under the
Warsaw Convention
The Lockerbie court correctly acknowledged that the War-
saw Convention is silent on whether a plaintiff may state a claim
for punitive damages.8 Under the Warsaw Convention claim-
ants are limited to $75,000 in damages unless willful misconduct
is established. Commentators have argued that this liability
its object and purpose. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, §
3, Art. 31(1), reprinted in SWEENEY gr AL., supra note 72, at 247. Although not yet offi-
cially adopted by the United States, "the Department of State has stated since 1973 that
it considers the convention as a codification of customary international law and thus...
authoritative .... See SWEENEY, supra note 72, at 993-94. Commentators such as Dick-
erson, supra, and cases like Chan, 490 U.S. at 122, fail to take into account these inter-
national principles of statutory interpretation. As such the holding of Chan is questiona-
ble and Dickerson's formalistic approach to statutory interpretation may have no place
in the international context.
Other commentators argue that statutes should be analyzed under an evolving ap-
proach, giving new meanings to words as new situations and new problems arise. These
commentators believe that "statutory interpretation as a practical exercise... may con-
sider the evolution of a statute as well as its historical origins." William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1989). These
commentators believe that a statute is not an isolated structure to be interpreted accord-
ing to its strict and limited terms, but should be read against changed legal and social
circumstances. Id. at 1018. See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Inter-
pretation, 87 MicH. L. REV. 20, 24-27 (1988).
Under such an analysis, the Second Circuit should have endeavored to discover
whether circumstances have changed since the Convention's drafting that might warrant
an acceptance of punitive awards. The Second Circuit might have examined whether
punitive awards would have served a therapeutic goal such as increasing safety stan-
dards, or whether modern airlines are still in need of liability limitations. While the Sec-
ond Circuit itself did not acknowledge that it was investigating whether to expand the
scope of the Convention, it could be argued that the Lockerbie court did implicitly en-
gage in such an inquiry. After all, the Second Circuit did examine the effect that punitive
damages would have if available under the Convention. The court concluded that puni-
tive damages would thwart the Convention's uniform liability scheme and would increase
the volume and complexity of litigation and airline liability. 928 F.2d at 1287-88. It is
understandable then why the court would not be willing to give birth to such disarray
absent some directive from the legislative branch.
[Courts] do not sit to decide whether laws are no longer necessary or to assess
the diplomatic consequences of their abandonment. The Warsaw Convention is
not a treaty that has moldered on the books. On the contrary it has had ago-
nized reappraisal by the Executive and Legislative branches. [The court's]
duty is to enforce the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States,
whatever they might be, and until one of the ... branches [of government]
declares otherwise, the Warsaw Convention remains the supreme law of the
land.
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).
88 928 F.2d at 1269-70.
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limit is both unfair and inadequate for a number of reasons.87
First, the airline industry is no longer a struggling or burgeoning
industry in need of protection, but instead is a developed and
established one.8 Second, punitive damages are necessary to
force air carriers to maintain high safety standards." These crit-
icisms notwithstanding, the Warsaw Convention does provide
for unlimited compensatory liability when willful misconduct is
established. Generally, willful misconduct is an essential element
to an award of punitive damages.90 Plaintiffs are therefore al-
ready adequately compensated under the Convention when an
airline has engaged in willful misconduct. Additionally, the mar-
ketplace severely punishes airlines that fail to maintain high
safety standards through negative publicity and, in turn, de-
8 Nancy J. Strantz, Aviation Security and Pan Am Flight 103: What Have We
Learned?, 56 J. Am L. & Com. 413, 422-31 (1990); see also Sheinfeld, supra note 5, at
681-83.
See Strantz, supra note 87, at 429; Thomas J. Dolan, Warsaw Convention Liabil-
ity Limitations, 6 NW. J. INT'L L & Bus. 896, 914 (1984). The thrust of these arguments
is that the airline industry no longer needs special protection and the $75,000 limit is
arbitrarily low and inadequate to compensate victims fully. However, the fact that one of
the treaty's intended goals has become obsolete is not an excuse for the judiciary to
ignore the treaty altogether.
While it is true that the airline industry is both developed and established, these are
not grounds to ignore the damage limitations imposed by the treaty. A uniform applica-
tion of rules is essential to an industry that involves so many different nations and legal
systems. Additionally, it is not altogether clear how established and stable the airline
industry presently is. The recent demise of Pan Am, Eastern, Midway and Braniff air-
lines and the constant financial difficulties of Continental, Northwest and TWA all point
out that the airline industry is not so secure. Abnormally large liability awards could
potentially prevent these surviving companies from maintaining financial stability. Fur-
thermore, in many nations, the airline industry is hardly well developed. For instance,
with the breakup of the Soviet Union, new airlines are being established in many of the
Republics. See Aeroflot Takes Aim at the Post-Communist World, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 12,
1992, at C7. These airlines could potentially look to the Convention to help stabilize
their liability costs in the initial stages of development So while the United States' air-
line industry might be developed, that is not necessarily the case for all members of the
Convention or for potential future members.
89 Concerns about the safety of international flight have heightened in recent
years. Terrorist activity has no boundaries, and passenger aircraft more than
twenty years old continue to fly despite their known wear and tear. Although
the Warsaw Convention did not expressly provide for a recovery of punitive
damages in cases of willful misconduct.., perhaps the threat and the eco-
nomic reality of punitive damages will force air carriers to increase safety mea-
sures aboard passenger aircraft.
Buono, supra note 15, at 603. For a criticism of this theory, see infra notes 133-38 and
accompanying text.
90 See infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
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creased ridership. Since the Convention is silent on the issue of
punitive damages and such awards are inconsistent with the
Convention's goals, the Second Circuit was justified in conclud-
ing that punitive damages are not available under the Warsaw
Convention."
1. Punitive Damages Generally
Punitive damages are private fines awarded to punish repre-
hensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.2 Generally,
punitive damages are not imposed to compensate for a plaintiff's
injury.9 3 The United States Supreme Court has consistently rec-
ognized the penal nature of punitive damage awards.9 4 The
Court has also criticized excessive punitive damage awards and
the resulting threat to potential technological innovations.,
91 For a detailed discussion of why the Lockerbie court cannot be faulted for exam-
ining the goals of the Convention instead of merely relying on the Convention's text, see
supra note 85.
" See International Bd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979) (punitive
damages designed to punish certain conduct and deter future similar behavior but are
not intended to compensate for injury). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
908(1) (1979) ("[Plunitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, be-
cause of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.").
91 International Bd. of Elec. Workers, 442 U.S. at 48; see also Browning-Ferris In-
dus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1989) (O'Connor, J. concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (punitive damages are not awarded to compensate for injury, but
to further the aims of the criminal law and deter future similar conduct). However, there
are some states that do view punitive awards as having a compensatory element. For
instance, in New York, "courts view punitive damages as having a purpose beyond pun-
ishment, affording the injured party a personal monetary recovery over and above com-
pensatory loss." Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1989); see supra note
67.
"Browning Ferris, 492 U.S. at 280 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing Supreme Court cases from 1893-1987 in which the Court has articulated
that punitive damages are intended to punish the defendant). See, e.g., Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 422, n.7 (1987) (punitive damages intended to punish and are there-
fore legal and not equitable in nature); Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477
U.S. 299, 306, n.9 (1986) (federal common law of tort views punitive damages as designed
to punish a defendant); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (punitive
damages are "private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to
deter its future occurrence"); Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107
(1893) (punitive damages are not awarded to compensate the sufferer but to punish the
offender and warn others).
91 In Browning-Ferris Justice O'Connor articulated the fear that skyrocketing puni-
tive damage awards might prevent manufacturers from placing needed products in the
market (i.e. new pills or vaccines). 492 U.S. at 272 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor pointed to recent punitive awards ranging from $6-
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"[Plunitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plain-
tiffs, who are usually entitled to receive full compensation for
their injuries, but not more."""
Punitive and compensatory damages have different goals.
"Whereas compensatory damages are designed to 'have the
wrongdoer make the victim whole,' commensurate with the loss
or injury actually sustained, punitive damages are intended to
'punish the tort-feasor for [its] conduct and to deter... similar
action in the future.' ,,7 While there has been some debate as to
the appropriate type of conduct warranting an award of punitive
damages, it is generally agreed that "[p]unitive damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defend-
ant's evil motive or . .. reckless indifference to the rights of
others." '
The Lockerbie court clearly recognized the difference be-
$10 million. Id. Often the punitive damage award has little relation to the compensatory
damages. In Browning-Ferris the jury awarded $51,000 in compensatory damages for an
antitrust violation, but $6 million in punitive damages. This was 117 times the actual
damages suffered by the plaintiff. Id.
An analogy to other industries will help elucidate some of the problems of punitive
awards. It is probable that excessive punitive damage awards prevent companies from
spending money on other areas of business. Some manufacturers of prescription drugs
have decided that it is better to avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a new drug to
the market. See Brief for Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Assoc. et aL as Amid Curiae at 5-23,
cited in Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 282. "Similarly designers of airplanes and
motor vehicles have been forced to abandon new projects for fear of lawsuits that can
often lead to punitive damages." Id.; see generally P. Htman, L mn.rrv: TE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 152-71 (1988), cited in Browning-Ferris Indus., 492
U.S. at 282. Specifically, punitive damages could prevent airlines from being financially
able to purchase security devices that would better detect bombs or spend money on
increased security personnel. Admittedly, there is no guarantee the money will be spent
on such security items by preempting punitive claims.
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983)(Rehnquist, J. d senting). Recently the
Supreme Court has even expressed doubts about the constitutionality of certain punitive
damage awards. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. CL 1032, 1038 (1991)(pu-
nitive damage award of $800,000, although large in proportion to damages, did not vio-
late the 14th Amendments Due Process Clause).
97 Racich v. Celotex Corp., 887 F.2d 393, 396 (2d Cir. 1989)(under New York law
and public policy, punitive damages could be awarded in product liability actions involv-
ing exposure to asbestos in order to punish the manufacturer).
" Smith, 461 U.S. at 46-47, quoting REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 903(2)
(1979); see Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1986) (punitive damages
will encourage plaintiffs to pursue a manufacturer that has engaged in a deliberate act or
omission with a high degree of probability of harm to others); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (to warrant an award of punitive damages, it
must be shown that the acts or conduct were willful, intentional and done in conscious
disregard of the results).
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tween punitive and compensatory damages in analyzing whether
punitive damages are available under the Convention. While the
Second Circuit noted that a minority of states viewed punitive
damages as serving both a penal and compensatory role, the
court understood punitive damages to have primarily a penal
function.9 9 Therefore, the Lockerbie court examined whether the
Convention was intended to punish and deter future misconduct
by international airlines.
2. Convention Designed to Award Compensatory Damages
Only
The Second Circuit first examined Article 17 of the Conven-
tion, which governs the right to seek damages in actions con-
trolled by the Convention.0 " The Second Circuit determined
that Article 17 was only compensatory in nature. 101 To reach this
conclusion, the Second Circuit paid particular attention to the
civil law background of the Convention. The Lockerbie court
noted that punitive damages are not usually awarded in civil law
nations.10 2 The court reasoned that civil law nations view puni-
" 928 F.2d at 1271-73; see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
,00 Article 17 reads as follows:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if
the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
928 F.2d at 1280.
101 The sum of the context in which the Article was written, the law of the
contracting parties, subsequent interpretations, and the historical translation
argue persuasively that Article 17 establishes liability for compensatory dam-
ages only, and that it would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Warsaw
Convention to read Article 17 as permitting the recovery of punitive damages.
Id. at 1281-82. For a discussion of why the original French version of the Convention
supports a finding that Article 17 is designed only to compensate, see supra note 82.
102 The Warsaw Convention was drafted under the predominant influence of civil
law. See GEORGETTE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 78 (1977); 928
F.2d at 1281 ("Under civil law ... an action under the Warsaw Convention sounds in
contract. Punitive damages are generally not available in civil law contract actions. In
fact, under the civil law they do not appear to be available at all."); see also In re San
Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79, 85 (D.P.R. 1990) ("Punitive dam-
ages is a foreign concept to ... civil law tradition."); Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples
de Puerto Rico v. San Juan, 289 F. Supp. 858, 859-60 (D.P.R. 1968) ("It may be validly
asserted that in Puerto Rico, which is a Civil Law country, the doctrine of punitive dam-
ages does not prevail."); Richard J. Mahoney, Punitive Damages: It's Time to Curb the
Courts, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 11, 1988, at 3 ("Punitive damages are an anomaly peculiar to
the United States and are virtually unknown in the world's remaining civil-law coun-
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tive damages as both excessive and redundant when unlimited
compensatory damages are available. 0 3 Like some courts in the
United States, civil law nations view punitive damages as a
windfall.14 In the end, the Second Circuit found that these civil
law concepts supported the court's position that punitive dam-
age awards were not available under the Convention.10
5
While the Convention is silent on punitive damages, the
court viewed this silence as favoring the award of compensatory
damages only. The Convention's drafters probably never consid-
ered the question of whether punitive damages should be
awarded, for if they had, the overwhelming civil law presump-
tion against punitive damages would have led to printed de-
bate.106 Instead, the drafting history is silent on the subject.10n
Indeed, in the one instance where adding a penal element to the
treaty was considered, the drafters rejected the provision.10 In
the absence of any indication by the drafters that they intended
to include punitive damages in the Convention, the court rea-
soned that it was not the role of courts to carve out new rights
tries."). As a symptom of the division between the civil and common law doctrine on
punitive damages, United States courts attempting to gain jurisdiction over foreign de-
fendants have sometimes had difficulty getting civil law nations to accept service of pro-
cess when the complaint seeks punitive awards. See Brief for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae, Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988), cited in GARY B.
BORN & DAVID WEsriN, INTERNATIONAL CxVIL LITIGATION IN UNIrrD STATEs CoumR 139
n.79 (1991) (describing the difficulties that have arisen in convincing West German au-
thorities to accept service of process of United States complaints that seek punitive dam-
ages). Additionally, international law has not permitted punitive damages in cases seek-
ing damages for personal injury or death. See Chile-United States Comm. Convened
under the 1914 Treaty For the Settlement of Disputes: Decision With Regard to the
Dispute Concerning Responsibility for the Deaths of Letelier and Mofitt, 31 I.1,. 1
(1992).
203 928 F. 2d at 1285-86.
104 Id.
105 Id.
10 See supra note 102.
107 See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 17-20, In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928
F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7388).
108 Pan Am argued that in the one instance where punitive measures were suggested,
they were rejected. The drafters considered a proposal that would impose punitive mea-
sures on carriers that did not satisfy the Warsaw Convention's requirements on passen-
ger tickets, baggage tickets and airway bills. The proposal for punitive sanctions was
objected to by the British delegation. A compromise was reached where the proposed
punitive measures were not included. Id. at 19-20. Therefore, the scant legislative history
involving punitive measures shows that the drafters were not inclined to consider pro-




for litigants. 10 9 The Lockerbie court acted appropriately by de-
clining to read meanings into the Convention's language that
were neither present nor intended.
The court then turned its attention to the language of Arti-
cle 24.110 Article 24 states that certain procedural rules under
the Convention are to be determined by local law."' The Lock-
erbie court concluded that Article 24 was intended solely to reg-
ulate the question of who had standing to sue under the Conven-
tion and how much in damages could be awarded. The court,
however, did not believe that the Convention allowed local law
to determine the types of damages available under the Conven-
tion." 2 The Second Circuit concluded that the drafting history
of Article 24, together with the civil law background of the Con-
vention described above, made it extremely unlikely that Article
24 was intended by the drafters to preserve a right to punitive
damages under the Convention. 1 '
This interpretation of Article 24 is open to serious criticism.
The Second Circuit itself admitted that commentators and case
law agree that the Convention leaves the amount of damages to
be determined by the local laws of member nations, but subject
to the $75,000 cap expressly provided for in the Convention.1 4
109 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
1 0 Article 24 reads as follows:
(1) In the cases governed by articles 18 and 19 [baggage claims] any action for
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and
limits set out in this convention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph
shall also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons
who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.
928 F.2d at 1282.
"1I In the five instances where the law of the forum is to apply, the rules state so
explicitly; Article 21 (contributory negligence); Article 24(2)(standing of and allocation
among survivors); Article 25 (standards for willful misconduct); Article 28 (rules for de-
termining venue); and Article 29 (running of the statute of limitations). Reed v. Wiser,
555 F.2d 1079, 1092 (2d Cir. 1977).
112 928 F.2d at 1282-84. Plaintiffs specifically argued that Article 24 permitted local
law to determine the type of damages awarded under the Convention. See Brief of plain-
tiffs-appellants at 17, In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991) (No.
90-7388). Plaintiffs submitted that the Second Circuit had previously held that the Con-
vention was not intended to be exclusive and therefore provided for the application of
local law. Id., citing Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. v. McDonnell Douglas, 617 F.2d at 942.
However, this argument is specious since the Tokio decision did not specifically hold that
the Convention provided for state claims. See supra note 71.
113 928 F.2d at 1284.
'" Id., citing Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1002-03 (9th Cir.
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Therefore, the drafters could have also intended local law to de-
termine the types of damages available within the Convention's
$75,000 limitation.
Yet the conclusion that the drafters might have left the
types of damages question to local law is refuted by the Conven-
tion's history and logic. The drafters' primary concern when
writing Article 24 was how to regulate who had standing to sue
under the Convention."1 5 The signatories of the Convention real-
ized that establishing a uniform rule on who could sue would be
impossible to achieve. Each nation's laws on which party has the
right to sue in wrongful death actions varied widely. Therefore,
in an effort to promote acceptance of the Convention's overall
goals, the drafters decided to allow the specific issue of standing
to be resolved by local law.
That the drafters would have left the question of the types
of awards available to local law is unlikely. First, Article 17 only
establishes liability for injuries sustained by passengers. The
drafters exhibited no intent to provide punitive awards.110 Sec-
ond, leaving to local law the issue of the types of damages avail-
able would lead to much uncertainty regarding the scope of air
carrier liability, thereby undermining the Convention's goal of
establishing a uniform liability scheme. This problem would be
compounded when a finding of willful misconduct permits an
1987) ("damages are to be measured according to the internal laws of a party to the
Convention"); Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 855 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965) (Convention left certain issues such as the proper beneficiaries
of an award to local law). However, according to the Second Circuit, no case has ever
addressed the issue of whether the type of damages left to be determined by local law
could include punitive damages. 928 F.2d at 1283. The above authorities do support that
local law will determine the amount or level of damages awarded, subject to the $75,000
cap, but do not support the proposition that local law will determine the composition of
the award (i.e. compensatory or punitive). In short, local United States law could deter-
mine how much to award as long as the award is under the $75,000 Convention limit.
Additionally, these authorities point out that Article 24 was designed to regulate the
question of who had standing to sue under the Warsaw Convention.
I'l In case of decease of a passenger carried, the lawsuit regarding responsibil-
ity may be taken by the persons who have a right to take such action according
to the law of the land of the deceased person but under the reserve of the
limitation of responsibility provided for in the [Convention.]
928 F.2d at 1283 (citing Initial Draft of Article 24, International Conference on Private
Aviation Law (Paris 1926)(State Department Translation)(Addendum at 12a). This lan-
guage clearly evidences an intent of the drafters to limit Article 24's use of local law to
determine questions of standing.
I" See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
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unlimited liability award. 117 While leaving to local law the issue
of who has standing also creates some uncertainty, there is a sig-
nificant difference between who has the right to divide a wrong-
ful death action reward and how much of the reward there is to
divide. The Convention was intended only to limit this latter
concern.
118
The Second Circuit also considered the ramifications of Ar-
ticle 25,119 which provides that the $75,000 liability limit can be
lifted if willful misconduct on the part of the airlines can be
proved. In such a scenario, the level of damages awarded can be
unlimited. Therefore, the question remained whether the draft-
ers of Article 25 envisioned the award of punitive damages when
willful misconduct is established. The Second Circuit held that
Article 25 referred only to the lifting of the $75,000 cap on com-
pensatory limitations. 120 The court reasoned that under the civil
law unlimited damages are available only to prevent a willful
tortfeasor from escaping full responsibility from the damages it
causes by hiding behind the shield of the Convention's liability
7 See infra notes 139-79 and accompanying text. This problem manifests itself
where the $75,000 liability limit has been lifted because of a finding of willful miscon-
duct. While there will be a certain amount of unpredictability when unlimited compensa-
tory awards can be awarded, such wrongful death awards can be determined by examin-
ing the scope of the appropriate wrongful death statute. In such cases an airline will be
able to predict, for insurance purposes, the amount of damages that could be awarded.
With the prospect of punitive damages, predictability would be much more difficult
given that there are no set judicial limits on permissible levels of punitive damage
awards and juries are allowed wide discretion in awarding punitive awards. See supra
notes 92-99 and accompanying text. See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIAL
ON ToatTs 793 (1990). The Convention would be a useless tool in controlling an airline's
exposure to liability if airlines could not adequately predict and therefore protect against
damage awards.
118 The Convention was concerned with how high liability awards would be and not
who was going to receive those awards. Therefore, reading Article 24 as allowing local law
to determine who had standing to sue is not inconsistent with prohibiting local law to
determine the issue of punitive awards. If local law determines that 10 different parties
have standing to sue for one death, then those 10 claimants would split one liability
award. The award, however, cannot exceed a total of $75,000 unless willful misconduct
can be established.
119 Article 25 reads as follows:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this con-
vention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his will-
ful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of
the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to will-
ful misconduct.




limitations."2 Moreover, civil law nations tend not to allow or
provide for punitive damage awards.122 The Lockerbie court rea-
soned that Article 25 was not to be viewed as a back door at-
tempt to punish carriers for their intentional acts. 23
Like the Second Circuit's understanding of Article 24, this
interpretation of Article 25 is also open to criticism. Nothing in
the language of the Convention would prohibit interpreting Arti-
cle 25 as lifting all limits on liability, thereby providing for puni-
tive damages in the case of willful misconduct. In fact the ele-
ments necessary to prove willful misconduct and to establish
grounds for punitive damages are quite similar.124 Additionally,
it would only seem logical that airlines should be exposed to
greater liability when they have engaged in intentional
misconduct.
However, these interpretations are inconsistent with the
context in which the Convention was drafted. A group of na-
tions, primarily grounded in civil law, would not have permitted
Article 25 to provide for punitive damage awards without any
debate. 2 " When the text of the Convention does not readily sup-
ply an answer, "the words used should be given a meaning con-
sistent with the shared expectations of the contracting par-
121 Id. at 1285-86.
12 See supra note 102.
12 928 F.2d at 1285.
, See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
1 While it is true that the United States has a long history of awarding punitive
damages in tort-related accidents, it must be remembered that the United States was not
officially present at the Warsaw Convention. The United States was only present to ob-
serve the proceedings. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 502. Therefore, it
is unlikely that the United States had significant influence in drafting the Convention.
Consequently, the drafters' intentions were most likely guided by their civil law mind-
sets. One commentator has argued that since punitive damages are unique to common
law, the failure of the Convention's drafters to discuss the issue should not be dispositive
in determining whether punitive damages are available under the Convention. See
Buono, supra note 15, at 603. Yet this argument fails to address the reality that civil law
nations do not normally provide for punitive awards and that the drafting history's si-
lence on the issue is most likely an indication that punitive damages were never seriously
considered. Additionally, once one examines the potential results of allowing punitive
damages, it becomes clear that punitive damages would hinder the achievement of the
Convention's goals. For a discussion of the effect punitive damages would have if availa-
ble under the Warsaw Convention, see infra notes 139-79 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of why the Second Circuit did not err in examining the drafters' intent as part
of its analysis of the punitive damage issue and an examination of why other methods of




ties."128 Since Article 25 is not clear on exactly what liability
limits it lifts, it was necessary for the Second Circuit to deter-
mine what the drafters would have intended. The drafters, espe-
cially those from civil law countries, would most likely have been
antagonistic toward the concept of punitive awards. Therefore,
the Lockerbie court correctly concluded that Article 25 refers to
the lifting of liability limits on compensatory awards only.127
3. Article 25 Obviates the Need for Punitive Damages
While the Convention's $75,000 liability limit may currently
be inadequate to compensate victims, Article 25 provides for the
awarding of unlimited liability when willful misconduct can be
shown.12 The Convention provides that "[w]illful misconduct
requires either 'the intentional performance of an act with
knowledge that the performance of that act will probably result
in injury' or 'the intentional performance of an act in such a
manner as to imply reckless disregard of the probable conse-
quences.' ,,129 This definition is quite similar to the standard ap-
126 Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1280, citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985).
127 928 F.2d at 1285.
128 See supra note 119.
129 Republic Nat'l Bank of New York v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 815 F.2d 232, 238-39
(2d Cir. 1987) (an air carrier's omissions from a release form resulting in the loss of
plaintiff's currency did not constitute willful misconduct under the Convention). Judge
Platt in the Eastern District of New York-instructing the Lockerbie jury on the stan-
dard to determine whether Pan Am was willfully liable for the Lockerbie disas-
ter-defined willful misconduct as "the intentional performance of an act with knowl-
edge that performance of the act will probably result in injury or damage or it may be
the intentional performance of an act in such a manner as to imply disregard of the
probable consequences of the performance of the act." Arnold H. Lubasch, Pan Am Is
Held Liable By Jury In '88 Explosion, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1992, at Al. However, it is
not necessarily clear that the jury's willful misconduct determination will be upheld. Re-
cently the Second Circuit overturned a finding of willful misconduct in Ospina v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 1992 WL 212001 (2d Cir. Sept. 3, 1992). In Ospina a bomb exploded
on a TWA flight approaching Athens, Greece. The Second Circuit held that TWA had
not engaged in willful misconduct since all regular safety procedures had been followed
and no Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") rules or regulations had been violated.
Id. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could have determined that TWA had
engaged in willful misconduct. Id. However, the court did not establish a clear standard
of what types of violations would warrant a finding of willful misconduct. Therefore, it is
feasible that the Second Circuit could also overturn the finding of willful misconduct in
the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. However, since the Lockerbie disaster did involve
breaches of FAA regulations, the willful misconduct holding should not be overturned.
Plaintiffs have argued that Pan Am violated section XV (1)(a) of the FAA's Air Carrier
Standard Security Program, which requires airlines to match baggage with passengers.
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plied in determining whether punitive damages should be
awarded: "[P]unitive damages may be awarded [when] conduct.
. is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or...
reckless indifference to the rights of others."'130 Consequently,
conduct that would qualify for the lifting of liability limits under
Article 25 would seemingly justify an award of punitive
damages. 1'
However, the Lockerbie court rightfully cautioned against
courts using Article 25 to award both unlimited liability and pu-
nitive damages. The Second Circuit stressed the civil law's ten-
dency to denounce punitive damage awards: "The civil law ap-
pears to [conclude] that the award of full compensatory damages
alone is sufficient to deter willful misconduct, [therefore] puni-
tive damages would be both excessive and redundant."' 32 This
analysis is consistent with interpreting the Convention in a man-
ner that promotes the Convention's primary goal of limiting air-
line liability. Excessive and redundant liability awards would
prevent airlines from reducing their exposure to exorbitant lia-
bility judgments.
Nonetheless, some argue that punitive damages are neces-
sary to insure that airlines maintain high safety standards. 3
Undeniably, airline safety is of the utmost importance. Yet the
See TWA Ruling Overturned, WoRLD INS. RnEoar, Oct 9, 1992.
1O Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,47 (1983) (quoting RETATmmmm (SacoN) OF ToRTS
§ 908(2) (1979)).
131 The Lockerbie court clearly recognized the similarity between punitive damages
and the willful misconduct clause of Article 25. However, the court found that their pur-
poses served different roles. The court noted that deterrence is a goal of both punitive
damages and Article 25. Nevertheless, the court concluded that punitive damages are
intended merely to punish defendants while Article 25 is designed to insure that no air-
line escapes its financial responsibility when acting egregiously. 928 F.2d at 1285-86. The
difference is highlighted by the civil law belief that unlimited compensatory damages, in
and of themselves, will deter future misconduct, leaving punitive measures unnecessary.
H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LAmrrms IN IN ATONAL AiR LAw 211 (1954).
928 F.2d at 1285-86. At first glance it is not clear how punitive and compensatory
damages can be deemed excessive and redundant if they are intended to serve different
purposes. However, they are arguably redundant and excessive when examined in the
context of the Convention. The Convention was structured to provide for compensatory
damages only. Further, the Convention was designed to compensate passengers ade-
quately while establishing some limits on an airline's potential liability. See supra notes
14-29 & 100-27 and accompanying text. Therefore an award designed to punish would be
excessive in a liability scheme designed to provide compensatory damages only. The
award would also be redundant since Article 25 already fully compensates claimants by
providing unlimited liability.
SS See Buono, supra note 15, at 603.
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Warsaw Convention was not intended to regulate airline
safety.13 4 Rather, the Convention was designed to standardize
airline liability. 3 5 Thus, allowing punitive damages cannot be
justified under an airline safety rationale: the Convention was
designed only to provide passengers with compensatory awards.
Moreover, the inability of courts to award punitive damages
under the Convention will not lead to decreased airline safety
standards.136 The marketplace exacts a high price for lapses in
safety precautions. Pan Am's reputation, financial stability and
its ultimate existence suffered greatly as a result of the Lock-
erbie disaster. 137 For example, the sale of Pan Am's London
I3 For a discussion of why courts should not be involved in legislating new, al.
though arguably worthy, objectives into the Convention, see supra note 85 and accompa-
nying text. If the Warsaw Convention were intended to act as a regulatory force on air-
line safety, its text or legislative history would evidence as much. However, as of now,
the Convention is designed to regulate only certain rules and procedures concerning the
airline industry, such as ticketing, baggage claims and liability standards. Regulations
involving airline safety must come from other areas of the law. For instance, the Chicago
Convention of 1944 ("Chicago Convention") is an international treaty regulating aviation
safety. The Chicago Convention leaves issues of deterrence and punishment to regulatory
agencies of member nations. See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7,
1944, 612 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. 1591 (1947); see also Brief for the Air Transport Associa-
tion of America as Amicus Curiae at 6, In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d
Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7388) (Warsaw Convention is concerned with compensating claimants,
not with aviation safety or deterrence and punishment of airlines).
13 See Brief of the Air Transport Association of America as Amicus Curiae at 6, In
re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1991) (No. 90-7388).
136 Id. at 16-18. Additionally, it seems more appropriate for punitive-type measures
to come from treaties or regulatory agencies designed to monitor airline safety standards.
Whether or not organizations, such as the FAA, actively and effectively enforce regula-
tory guidelines is an issue for the executive and legislative branches to determine. Courts
should not engage in legislative decisionmaking merely because they fear that adminis-
trative agencies are not fulfilling their congressionally mandated roles. For a discussion
of why courts should not engage in judicial legislating, see supra note 85.
137 See Pan Am's 1990 Loss Nearly Doubles 1989's, AVIATION WEEKLY & SPACE
TECH., May 27, 1991, at 31 ("Pan Am Corp. lost $662.9 million in 1990, a net loss nearly
double that incurred in the year after a terrorist's bomb destroyed a Pan American
World Airways Boeing 747 over Scotland."); Philip Robinson, Britain Holds Key to Pan
Am's Fate, THE TnmEs (London), Jan. 9, 1991, at 4 (estimating that the Lockerbie disas-
ter cost Pan Am $350 million); Keith Bradsher, A Year of Tribulation for Pan Am, N.Y.
T hmzs, Nov. 9, 1989, at D1 ("More than 10 months after a terrorist bomb destroyed a
Pan American World Airways jetliner over Lockerbie, Scotland, many travelers, particu-
larly business people, continue to avoid the carrier. The Scottish tragedy ... will have
cost the airline up to $250 million in foregone ticket sales .... "). Cf. Court Absolves
Government in Delta L-1011 Crash, AVIATION DAiLY, Sept. 5, 1989, at 436 (Delta foresees
$150 to $200 million in claims from 1985 crash in Dallas); Boeing, JAL to Compensate
Crash Victims, AViATION WEEKLY & SPACE TECH., Oct. 14, 1985, at 30 (losses to JAL,
including loss of business, could exceed $280 million as a result of a JAL jet disaster,
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routes to United Airlines can be traced, in part, to the Lockerbie
disaster.138 Arguably, Pan Am's bankruptcy can also be viewed,
in part, as a marketplace adjustment in light of the Lockerbie
crash.
B. Independent State Claims Would Not Promote the Con-
vention's Goals
In support of its position that punitive damages are not
available under the Convention, the Second Circuit examined
the possible ramifications of allowing independent state claims
in actions governed by the Convention."3 9 The court correctly
held that the Warsaw Convention was the exclusive cause of ac-
tion by which claimants could seek recovery for wrongful death
or personal injuries.140 The court found that state claims were
preempted by the Convention; future plaintiffs are barred from
invoking state law to determine whether punitive damages are
available under the Convention. In so holding, the court
opined that state law claims would prevent the Convention from
achieving its goal of creating a uniform liability scheme. For the
court to have concluded otherwise would have presented inter-
national carriers with varying degrees of liability under each
which killed crew members and 520 passengers).
"' See Philip Robinson, Flight of Cash Brings Pan Am Full Circle, THE Tus
(London), Jan. 9, 1991, at 2.
9 In re Lockerbie, 928 F.2d 1267, 1275-78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 33
(1991).
140 Id. This part of the Second Circuit's decision has generated more controversy
than its holding on punitive damages. See supra note 8. Holding that the Convention
does not provide for punitive awards is a much more limited holding than concluding
that the Convention is the exclusive cause of action. To make the first decision effective,
however, the Second Circuit had no choice but to make the second determination. If a
claimant had the choice between suing under the Convention, which prohibits punitive
damage awards, or pursuing a claim under an alternative wrongful death action, which
permits a punitive award, a claimant would fight to litigate under the independent state
law claim. On the other side, the airline would fight tooth and nail to ensure that the
Convention controlled the litigation. Predictability and uniformity would never be
achieved as long as these various avenues of recourse were open to plaintiffs. Were plain-
tiffs to succeed in bringing state law claims, the Convention would become dead letter
law. Therefore, to lend support to its initial holding prohibiting punitive awards under
the Convention, the Second Circuit had to preempt all independent state claims. For a
further discussion of why preempting punitive claims and preempting all state claims
invokes the same analysis, see supra note 12.
141 928 F.2d at 1278.
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state's different rules on punitive damages.142
1. Preemption Doctrine
The Supreme Court has set forth when state law may be
preempted by federal law. 4 3 Federal legislation may expressly
12 One commentator has argued that the Warsaw Convention has never achieved its
goal of creating a uniform system of liability to govern international air travel. See Cagle,
supra note 3, at 953-54 (criticizing the Convention for its differing degrees of liability
award limitations). Different nations subscribe to one of the following: the original War-
saw Convention (liability limitation of $8300), the Hague Protocol of 1955 (lifting liabil-
ity to $16,600) or the Montreal Agreement of 1965 (lifting liability to $75,000 for flights
departing or arriving in the United States). Id. at 955-59. The United States currently
adheres to the Montreal Agreement. Cagle points out that "similarly situated passengers
suffering identical injuries on the same flight can recover different damage amounts ....
Some passengers may recover only $8300 under the original Warsaw Convention while
others may recover $75,000" under the Convention as modified by the Montreal Agree-
ment. Id. at 998. For example, while the United States adheres to the $75,000 limit of
the Montreal Agreement, Mexico continues to follow the $16,600 limit of the Hague Pro-
tocol. However, Cagle's argument glosses over the significance of the generally low maxi-
mum recovery limits set by the Convention. While there is some variability among na-
tions, the variability is not exceptional and the maximum total payments will be within
the airline's means. After all, foreign nations are adhering to self-interest in keeping lia-
bility limits low; many airlines that belong to the Convention are state owned. Id. at 959,
964. The result is an assurance that all claimants will be paid.
There is, however, a difference between an airline knowing that it will be subject to
varying levels of liability depending upon which liability limit a nation endorses, see
Cagle, supra note 3, and an airline having to predict which applicable state punitive
damage laws will apply to a specific case. See infra notes 152-74 and accompanying text.
In the former case, an airline can guard against or react to a known liability standard by
obtaining insurance or reserving a set amount of money for potential liability awards. In
the latter situation, an airline must wait for a court determination on which liability
standard will be applied, making it virtually impossible to guard against and difficult to
react to potential liability. The cost in terms of money and time as the court determines
the rules to be applied on punitive awards would cut against the Convention's plan of
limiting liability and promoting certainty.
135 The Warsaw Convention as a treaty is the supreme law of the land. U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2. The question therefore is whether the Convention is meant to be the exclu-
sive law of the land on the issue of liability or whether state law is also applicable to
international airline suits.
The answer as to whether to preempt state law turns on an examination of the con-
gressional intent in enacting the statute. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485
U.S. 293, 299 (1988) (state law regulating natural gas transportation is preempted by
federal law because of evidence of congressional intent to preempt state regulation of
interstate natural gas transportation). Congress may expressly preempt state law. See
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (Congress expressly preempted state
regulation on labeling of packaged food). When Congress is not explicit, preemption may
be justified when Congress implicitly indicates an intent to occupy a given field. "Such a
purpose properly may be inferred where the pervasiveness of the federal regulation pre-
cludes supplementation by the States, where the federal interest in the field is suffi-
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preempt state law, or it may enact a scheme so pervasive that a
court may infer Congress left no room for the states to legislate
in that area."" State law may also be preempted when the sub-
ject matter involved demands uniformity and independent state
regulation would potentially jeopardize the purposes behind the
federal action.' 45 There is, however, a general presumption
against finding preemption of state law. 4
6
The Convention does not expressly forbid state intrusion
into international air carrier liability. Therefore state law claims
might be permissible under the Convention, especially consider-
ing that the Convention expressly leaves certain issues to be re-
solved by local law. 47 Accordingly, the Second Circuit properly
examined the possible ramifications of applying state law. Since
the Convention does not expressly preempt state claims, the
Lockerbie court could only justify preemption if it determined
that state wrongful death actions would prevent the Convention
ciently dominant." Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300.
Finally, state law may be preempted where federal and state law conflict. Such a
conflict may be evidenced by the inability of parties to comply with both the state and
federal law. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963) (state regulation of avocados upheld because it was not impossible to comply with
state and federal law regulating the marketing of avocados). A conflict between state and
federal law may also exist where the state law stands as an obstacle to accomplishing the
purposes and objectives behind the congressional act. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941) (state law regulating alien registration preempted because it prevented the
federal Alien Registration Act from acting as a comprehensive regulatory scheme).
144 See supra note 143.
145 Id.
146 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. Abrams, 899 F.2d
1315, 1319 (2d Cir. 1990) (New York Lemon Law was not preempted by the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act and Regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission).
The Supreme Court has cautioned ... that courts must, when considering a
preemption claim, give careful attention to the subject matter .... When Con-
gress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the States, [the court
should] start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
[are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress. Thus a litigant challenging a state statute on
preemption grounds must overcome a presumption against finding pre-emption
of state law.
Id. (citations omitted).
147 The Convention clearly leaves some issues to be determined by examining local
law. "Commentators and case law are in accord that the Convention leaves the measure
of damages to [local law]." Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1283; see supra note 114 and accompa-
nying text. Nations are free to set the level of damages as long as the damage award does
not exceed the $75,000 liability limit. Additionally, the Convention leaves the question of
"who are the proper beneficiaries of a damage award" to local law. 928 F.2d at 1282-83.
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from acting as a uniform standard for international airline liabil-
ity and a limiting force on such potential liability. 148
The Lockerbie court analyzed the conflicts that would arise
if plaintiffs could plead state punitive damage claims.140 The
court focused its attention on the complexity involved in ascer-
taining which state punitive damage laws would apply.', ° The
Second Circuit recognized that the existence of different state
laws on punitive awards would confront passengers and airlines
with inconsistent judicial determinations from one court to the
next. The court determined that state claims would indeed pre-
vent the Convention from creating a uniform standard on airline
liability and held these state claims preempted. Otherwise, state
law claims concerning the proper state punitive damage law to
apply to actions governed by the Convention might clog the
courts with litigation.1 51
2. Choice of Law Analysis
Choice of law analysis determines which state laws are to be
applied in a lawsuit.1 52 The law of the state where an action is
pending will not necessarily be the state law applied. If the par-
ties involved are from multiple states, or the action is pending
where the airline accident occurred, a court might conclude that
148 Interestingly, the Convention's international grounding never directly entered
the Second Circuit's determination of whether punitive damages and independent state
claims were preempted by the Convention. The Supreme Court has emphasized that
states have only the most limited roles in international relations. See BORN & WESTIN,
supra note 102, at 10-13. "These general principles are most obviously reflected in the
frequent preemption of state laws in the areas of foreign relations and foreign commerce
by inconsistent federal statutes, treaties and other international agreements." Id. at 10.
Since the Warsaw Convention is the express intent of many nations to cooperate on
international airline liability, the general presumption against preemption of state law is
significantly weakened.
149 928 F.2d at 1275-76.
150 Id.
151 The Second Circuit noted that the fear of an increase in the volume of litigation
is realistic. Potential claimants, especially foreigners, would seek to have their cases ad.
judicated in the United States because of the enormous windfall punitive awards might
bring if willful misconduct were established and Article 25's liability limitation lifted.
Foreign claimants could potentially receive much higher awards than are available in
other foreign jurisdictions. 928 F.2d at 1287. "[A]s a moth is drawn to the light, so
[would] a litigant [be] drawn to the United States ..... Smith Kline & French Labs. v.
Block, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (opinion of Lord Denning, M.R.), cited in BoRN & WES-
TIN, supra note 102, at 218.
12 See Paulsen, supra note 6, at 818-19.
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it is more appropriate to apply another state's law.10 3 At least
seven different theories have developed-each adopted in some
form by every state-to determine how a court should choose
which substantive state law to apply.1 ' Regardless of the
method employed, however, the results are often arbitrary, un-
predictable and inconsistent from state to state.""n Therefore,
depending upon the substantive law imposed by the choice of
law rule, the same case could be decided differently from one
15 Under the Erie doctrine, if a plaintiff were to bring a state claim, "a federal court
[sitting in diversity] must apply the choice of law rules of the district in which the court
sits, and then the substantive law of the applicable state." 928 F.2d at 1275. See also
Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941). Under New York law a
court must apply the substantive tort law of the state that has the most significant rela-
tionship with the occurrence and with the parties. See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America,
Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 194-99, 480 N.E.2d 679, 682-85, 419 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93-96 (1985); Bab-
cock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 288, 240 N.YS.2d 743, 752 (1963).
The most significant contacts are the parties' domiciles and the location of the tort. Sch-
ultz at 197, 480 N.E.2d at 684, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 95; In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel
Fire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79, 83-84 (D.P.R. 1990).
Therefore, if a federal court in the Eastern District of New York was adjudicating a
wrongful death action stemming from an airline crash that occurred in New York and
the parties involved were from Delaware, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, the court
would be faced with the prospect of applying either Delaware, Massachusetts, New York
or Pennsylvania law on the substantive issues. It is not entirely clear which state would
have the closest relationship to the plaintiffs in such a scenario. These laws might well
conflict with one another and a claimant's ability to recover may well depend on which
state law the court adopts.
'" The seven major rules that courts have employed when determining the applica-
ble state law are: (1) lex loci delicti (law of the state where the accident occurred ap-
plies); (2) most significant relationship (law of the state that has the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties involved applies); (3) government interest
analysis (law of the state with the greatest interest in the issues before the court applies);
(4) choice-influencing considerations (state law determined by balancing such policy con-
siderations as predictability, maintenance of order, advancing forum state's interests,
etc.); (5) center of gravity (apply state law based on a review of the importance of each
contact in relation to the facts of the case); (6) lex fori (law of the forum state will
always be applied); and (7) combined modem approaches (combining two or more of the
above analyses). See Paulsen, supra note 6, at 819-25.
15 Id; see, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989, 734 F.
Supp. 1425 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (in claims resulting from a 1989 crash by United Airlines in
Sioux City, Iowa, punitive damage claims against the airline governed by Illinois law,
punitive damage claims against the manufacturer determined by California law, and pu-
nitive damage claims against the engine manufacturer determined by Ohio law); In re
Aircrash Disaster at Stapelton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colorado, on Nov. 15, 1987, 720 F.
Supp. 1445, 1454-55 (D. Colo. 1988) (Texas law on punitive damages applied to an air
crash that took place in Colorado even though most of the ticlets were purchased in
Idaho). Although these cases were not governed by the Warsaw Convention, they exem-
plify the arbitrary results of choice of law analysis in airline accidents.
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state to the next.156
According to Article 28 of the Convention, "a suit may be
brought iri a court where the carrier is domiciled or has a princi-
pal place of business, or where the carrier has a place of business
through which the contract was made [i.e. where the ticket was
purchased] or . . .at the place of destination. 1 5 7 While this
places some limitations on where a lawsuit can be filed, it is no
great stretch to imagine an accident on a crowded international
flight that would leave an airline subject to suit in all fifty states
and a myriad of foreign nations.15 8 In a consolidated action such
as Lockerbie,150 a trial court could be faced with determining
which of the fifty state laws, and perhaps foreign laws, to apply.
A trial court might also be faced with the prospect of applying
different state laws to different parties within the same law-
suit.16 0 Allowing state law claims under the Convention would
inescapably lead to choice of law chaos and would entirely
thwart the Convention's goal of uniformity.
Choice of law issues might muddy the waters on the limits
of airline liability as well. States are almost equally divided on
the issue of whether punitive damages are available in wrongful
death actions. 6" A plaintiff's ability to collect punitive damages
might well be determined by the state law in which the plane
crash occurred.162 Therefore, punitive damages could be awarded
1"6 Paulsen, supra note 6, at 819-25.
15 928 F.2d at 1275.
'I' Since Article 28 provides as a proper venue the place where the ticket was pur-
chased, an airline with an international flight filled with hundreds of passengers would
likely be amenable to suit in many states and foreign lands.
1 733 F. Supp. 547 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
260 928 F.2d at 1275.
" For example, Massachusetts state law provides for the awarding of punitive dam-
ages in a wrongful death action, while Rhode Island does not. Compare MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 229, § 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982) with R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-7-1 (1985). If state law
determined whether punitive damages were to be applied under the Convention, plain-
tiffs could be denied equal availability of recovery. An airline flying from Providence,
Rhode Island to London, England could as easily crash in Massachusetts as Rhode Is-
land since both are neighboring states. However, the location of the crash could ad-
versely affect a claimant's right to recovery.
"It Under the lex loci delicti doctrine in choice of law analysis, a court is to choose
the applicable state law based upon where the accident occurred. Paulsen, supra note 6,
at 819. If the plane crashed in Massachusetts, the lex loci delicti doctrine would require
Massachusetts law to be applied. Therefore, punitive damages would be available under
the Convention. However, if the plane crashed in the neighboring state of Rhode Island,
the same plaintiff could not seek a punitive award. See supra note 161. The distinction
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through the back door via the appropriate choice of state law,
even'though the Convention itself does not permit punitive
damage claims. This back door approach would devastate the
Convention's limited liability goal.
Moreover, if the Warsaw Convention allowed state law to
determine the issue of punitive damages, litigation costs would
surely increase. Parties would be inclined to litigate the issue of
which state's law to apply when different state laws might be
more favorable to their respective positions.103 Potential litigants
would spend unnecessary time, money and effort on debating is-
sues of procedure instead of issues of substance.' Increased
costs would further thwart the Convention's main goal of limit-
ing airline liability. 6 5 Overall, the havoc the choice of law prob-
lem would have wreaked on the Convention's twin goals of uni-
formity and limited liability further supports the Second
Circuit's holding that state law claims are preempted under the
Convention.
between allowing for punitive damages in wrongful death actions in Massachusetts and
prohibiting them in Rhode Island would likely encourage an airline to seek the applica-
tion of Rhode Island law. Alternatively, claimants would seek to have Massachusetts law
applied to allow for the award of punitive damages. The Convention's goals of decreasing
and simplifying litigation would be lost. See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
Additionally, such arbitrary results would seem unfair to both plaintiffs and defendants.
Why should either party's rights be drastically affected by the unpredictable event of
where a plane may crash?
163 928 F.2d at 1276.
164 See In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapelton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colorado on
Nov. 15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Colo. 1988). This case was not governed by the
Warsaw Convention but exemplifies the difficulties that could arise if the Convention
provided for independent state causes of action. The court described the choice of law
dilemma as:
The burden [choice of law issues] place on judicial resources frustrates the
early and orderly resolution of issues which should demand greater attention-
compensating the victims or vindicating accused commercial entities. Specifi-
cally, state laws on the issue of punitive damages are not harmonious. Uncer-
tainty on the choice of law question requires a considerable expenditure of
time, money and other resources by... the litigants and counsel
Id. at 1454-55 (citations omitted) (Texas law on punitive damages applied to an air crash
that took place in Colorado even though most of the tickets were purchased in Idaho).
16 The Second Circuit clearly recognized this problem when it noted "[tihe exis-
tence of differing laws in various states--particularly respecting punitive dam-
ages-would frustrate the Convention's aims of uniformity and certainty .... "928 F.2d
at 1278. The court therefore concluded that state law claims must be preempted by the
Convention to allow the Convention to act as a uniform and limited liability scheme. Id.
at 1276. Had they ruled otherwise, the court would have been ignoring its obligation to
interpret the Convention in a manner that would promote the Convention's goals.
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3. Airlines' Ability to Insure Against Punitive Damage
Awards
To further illustrate the potential problems associated with
applying state law is the question of whether a state allows lia-
bility insurance to be obtained for punitive damage awards.166
Some states prohibit insurance against punitive damages based
on public policy grounds.16 7 Since punitive damages are usually
imposed to punish a wrongdoer and to deter future similar con-
duct, courts have held that these goals cannot be achieved if pu-
nitive damage awards are reimbursed by insurance companies.6 s
Alternatively, some courts reason that the freedom to contract
should leave the issue of whether punitive damages are insurable
"' For example, while Arizona, Georgia, Maryland, Virginia and Wisconsin permit
parties to insure against punitive awards, California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey and
New York do not. Compare Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522 (Ariz.
1972) (public policy favors enforcement of insurance policies that cover punitive dam-
ages); Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 232 S.E.2d 910 (Ga. 1977)
(Georgia statute authorizing insurance of legal liability includes punitive awards); First
Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 389 A.2d 359 (Md. 1978) (public
policy does not preclude liability coverage of punitive awards); Lipscombe v. Security
Ins. Co., 189 S.E.2d 320 (Va. 1971) (automobile insurance coverage includes punitive
damage awards); Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 267 N.W.2d 595 (Wis.
1978) (homeowner's liability insurance covers punitive awards) with City Prod. Corp. v.
Globe Indem. Co., 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (state law voids any insurance
contract that indemnifies awards based on willful misconduct); Nicholson v. American
Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 177 So.2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (insuring punitive
awards is inconsistent with the public policy goal of deterring willful misconduct); Bea-
ver v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 420 N.E.2d 1058 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (better view of puni-
tive awards is to promote their penal attributes and to prohibit their coverage in insur-
ance policies); Variety Farms, Inc. v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 410 A.2d 696 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980) (public policy does not permit a tortfeasor to shift the burden
of punitive damages to its insurer); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hemp-
stead, 48 N.Y.2d 218, 397 N.E.2d 737, 422 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1979) (insurance of punitive
damage awards is against public policy). See generally Stephen C. Kenney, Punitive
Damages In Aviation Cases: Solving The Insurance Coverage Dilemma, 48 J. AIR L. &
Com. 753, 753-54 nn.2-3 (1983).
17 Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962),
has been cited by one commentator as the leading example of courts refusing to permit
punitive damages to be insured on public policy grounds. McNulty involved the trial of
an intoxicated driver who crashed into another vehicle, resulting in a punitive award
against the driver. On appeal the Fifth Circuit held that since punitive awards were
designed to punish the defendant for his actions, this purpose could not be achieved if a
defendant was permitted to shift the financial burden imposed by punitive awards to
another party. 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962). See also Kenney, supra note 166, at
761-62 (noting that most courts, which have held that punitive awards are not insurable,




to the insurer and the insured. Additionally, these courts find
that prohibiting the insurance of punitive damages has no effect
on deterring future conduct and therefore question whether the
public good is harmed by these private contracts.',,
Air carriers would likely seek to be tried under that state
law which allows punitive damages to be insured. Insurance
companies, on the other hand, would seek to have cases tried in
forums that do not permit punitive awards to be insured. 17 0 As
insurance companies often pay for defense work, conflicts of in-
terest might arise between the airline and insurance agency.17 1
"The insured's pecuniary interests are potentially susceptible of
being sacrificed for those of the insurer because the insurer's
duty to defend generally includes the right to conduct and to
control the defense."1 72 If an insurer attempts to prevent a case
from being tried in a jurisdiction that allows punitive damages
to be insured, an airline will likely seek independent counsel.73
This conflict will undoubtedly increase airlines' litigation costs,
in direct contravention of the Convention's goal of limiting lia-
bility awards to enable carriers to insure against such losses. 74
Depending upon the choice of law rule applied, air carriers will
be faced with uncertain and arbitrary decisions relating to their
ability to insure against liability awards that include punitive
damages.
To permit state law claims seeking punitive awards would
undo both the uniformity and limited liability goals of the Con-
16 Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. has been cited as the leading decision
to justify the holding that punitive awards may be insured. 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1964).
As in McNulty, 307 F.2d at 432, see supra note 167, Lazenby involved an accident
caused by an intoxicated driver. However, in Lazenby the court held that punitive dam-
ages were insurable because it did not believe that prohibiting such reimbursements
would deter future similar conduct. The court determined that the public good was not
harmed by private contracts shifting the financial burden imposed by punitive awards.
383 S.W.2d at 5. See also Kenney, supra note 166, at 763-65.
170 Logically, it would seem that plaintiffs would not care whether punitive damages
are insurable and would probably not fight the airline on the appropriate state choice of
law on this issue. However, given the volatility of the airline industry, plaintiffs may
indeed desire to have punitive damages insured. Generally, an insurance company would
be in a better position to pay a punitive award than an airline that was facing potential
bankruptcy. Alternatively, if the airline was more financially secure than the insurer, a
plaintiff would prefer to make sure that state law required the airline to pay the award.
171 Kenney, supra note 166, at 770-71.
172 Id. at 771.
173 Id.
174 928 F.2d at 1276. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 499-500.
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vention. Airlines would be faced with inconsistent liability from
one jurisdiction to the next and would be forced to spend con-
siderable energy litigating the insurability of punitive damages.
For the Convention to achieve any of its purposes, the Lockerbie
court had no alternative but to hold that state law claims are
preempted by the Convention.
4. Presumption Against Preemption Overcome
Although the Lockerbie court recognized the general pre-
sumption against preempting state law,175 the Second Circuit
nevertheless concluded that to protect the Convention's uniform
liability scheme and its liability limitations, it had no choice but
to preempt the application of state law claims. 1 6 Three reasons
support this conclusion. First, state law on punitive damages di-
rectly conflicts with the goals of the Convention. Consequently,
under well-grounded principles of federalism, state law must
give way to the application of federal law.177 Second, preemption
of independent state claims is a positive step toward the uni-
form application of the Convention because it prevents the ap-
plication of different liability standards. 7 s Finally, international
treaties should be governed by federal law since state law has
traditionally remained outside the scope of international af-
1711 928 F.2d at 1278. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, Inc. v.
Abrams, 899 F.2d 1315, 1319 (2d Cir. 1990) (New York Lemon Law was not preempted
by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade
Commission because of the state interest in regulating car sales); see supra note 146.
176 928 F.2d at 1278.
1 For a discussion of the preemption doctrine, see supra notes 143-46 and accom-
panying text.
17 The Lockerbie decision does not create a uniform liability limit for all Warsaw
Convention members: its holding is only binding in the Second Circuit. But considering
that the Second Circuit houses major international airports, such as John F. Kennedy
and LaGuardia Airports, the court's holding that punitive damages are not available
under the Convention potentially apply to tens of thousands of air flights and millions of
passengers. See Sarah Bartlett, New York Feels Pinch of Slump in U.S. Tourists, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 5, 1991, at 1 (international arrivals at Kennedy, LaGuardia and Newark
increased to 11.3 million in 1990 compared to 10.8 million in 1989); Joseph W. Queen,
Study Finds Kennedy Airport May Be Long Gateway Status, NEWSDAY, Nov. 21, 1991,
at 39 (sixteen million international passengers passed through Kennedy, LaGuardia and
Newark Airports in 1989). Lawsuits litigated in the Second Circuit will enjoy the predict-
ability of the Convention's liability scheme. However, it must be noted that future claim-




fairs.Y In the end, the preemption of state claims was the only
alternative for the Lockerbie court to adopt.
C. The Building Blocks of the Second Circuit's Analysis
1. Direct Support for Preemption in the Eleventh Circuit
The Second Circuit is not the first court of appeals to hold
that punitivd damages are unavailable under the Convention.
Moreover, its analysis closely parallels those of other courts. The
Eleventh Circuit in Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.180 held that
claims seeking punitive damages under Florida state law were
preempted by the Warsaw Convention and further asserted that
any state claim which conflicted with the Convention's goals was
preempted.181
The Eleventh Circuit examined the manner in which state
punitive damage claims would affect the Convention's goals. The
Floyd court stated that the objectives of the Convention were
"to limit strictly the liability of the airlines and to provide a uni-
form and comprehensive scheme of liability.' 1 2 The court noted
that "[t]he Convention was intended to place strict limits on air
carrier liability for accidents .... Holding that punitive dam-
ages are unavailable in an action governed by the Warsaw Con-
vention furthers the goal of certainty of liability."8 3 The Floyd
court noted that there was a significant difference between the
cost to compensate a victim and the additional monetary liabil-
ity in awarding punitive damages to punish an airline. The court
opined that if punitive damage claims were available, liability
limitations would be impossible to achieve.""
The Lockerbie and Floyd courts looked to the Convention's
goals to justify their preemption of state punitive damage
17 See supra note 148.
180 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), revd on other grounds, III S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
While preempting state punitive damage claims, the Eleventh Circuit held that claims
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress were available under the Convention.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed and held that claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress were not available under the Convention. 111 S. Ct. at 1489. The Su-
preme Court, however, did not address the Eleventh Circuit'es holding on punitive
damages.
181 Id. at 1486-89.
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claims. These courts therefore remained faithful to the Conven-
tion's ideals.18 5
2. The Issue of Exclusivity in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits
The Lockerbie court determined that the question of
whether the Convention provides the exclusive cause of action
had not previously been answered by the Second Circuit.186
185 The Lockerbie court's analysis was not confined to an examination of court of
appeals' decisions. In Harpalani v. Air-India, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1986), the
Northern District of Illinois held that punitive damages were not available under the
Convention. The Harpalani court reasoned that the
purpose of the [Convention] was to establish strict limits on liability that
would adequately compensate passengers for most losses, [but] would also be
sufficiently low to permit carriers to insure against losses at reasonable rates..
. Allowing punitive damage awards would be inconsistent with this scheme,
both because carriers cannot insure against such awards, and because the pur-
pose of punitive damages-to punish and deter-is unrelated to the signato-
ries' goal of ensuring minimally adequate compensation.
Id. at 799. As did the Lockerbie court, the Harpalani court placed great emphasis on
advancing the Convention's goals.
The Second Circuit also examined another district court case which held that state
punitive damage claims were preempted. In In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, New-
foundland, on Dec. 12, 1985, 684 F. Supp. 927 (W.D. Ky. 1987), the court held that
"state law claims for punitive damages are pre-empted to the extent that they would
prevent the application of the Convention's limitations." Id. at 933.
"' Before 1978 the Second Circuit had consistently held that the Warsaw Conven-
tion did not create a cause of action to sue but only created a presumption of liability.
For example, the Convention could be used as a basis to measure airline liability but
could not be used as the legal basis upon which to bring suit. In wrongful death actions
plaintiffs would have to look to the applicable state statutes or to other legally recog-
nized causes of action. See Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Aire France, 209 F.2d 436
(2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolona,
247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957). Both Komlos and Noel have
been cited for the proposition that the Convention does not itself establish a cause of
action under which to sue. "The Second Circuit has spoken twice, the Supreme Court
has denied certiorari, and in all subsequent American Warsaw cases it was either as-
sumed or decided that the claim must be founded on some law other than the Conven-
tion itself." Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 5, at 519.
It was not until Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979), that a cause of action was recognized under the Con-
vention itself. In Benjamins the Second Circuit, overruling established precedents, held
that the Warsaw Convention created a cause of action for wrongful death. 572 F.2d at
919. The Benjamins court reasoned "that the desirability of uniformity in international
air law can best be recognized by holding that the Convention ... is ... the universal
source of a right of action." Id. The question then arises as to how the Lockerbie court
believed the question of exclusivity remained open. The court's language in Benjamins
seems clear: the Convention is the exclusive cause of action in cases governed by the
Warsaw Convention.
Perhaps one explanation for the Lockerbie court's tentative reading of Benjamins is
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Thus, the court examined the manner in which other jurisdic-
tions handled the issue.187 The court placed considerable signifi-
cance on those cases that construed the Convention's provisions
as promoting the Convention's goals. Specifically, in addition to
focusing on the Eleventh Circuit, the Lockerbie court looked to
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits' analysis of the issue of exclusiv-
ity.'88 The Second Circuit concluded that both circuits viewed
the Convention as the sole cause of action for cases arising under
the Warsaw Convention.
In Boehringer-Manhaim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan Am World
Airways, Inc."89 the Fifth Circuit held that the Warsaw Conven-
tion was the exclusive remedy against an international carrier
for loss or damage to cargo.190 While this holding is not the
that the Lockerbie court viewed the Benjamins court's treatment of the exclusivity issue
as mere dicta. Essentially, the Lockerbie court interpreted Benjamins as creating a cause
of action under the Convention but not necessarily creating the only cause of action.
Additionally, the Lockerbie court might have believed that reading the Benjamins deci-
sion as holding that the Convention was the exclusive cause of action was too far reach-
ing, considering that Benjamins had overturned a series of cases which held that the
Warsaw Convention created no cause of action at all. Thus, the Second Circuit felt the
need to examine the case law of other circuits to determine whether the Warsaw Conven-
tion should preempt state law causes of action. For a further discussion of why the Leck-
erbie court believed the question of exclusivity remained unanswered, see supra note 71
and accompanying text.
187 928 F.2d at 1276-77. In the cases examined by the Locherbie court there appears
to be much confusion between the issue of whether the Convention is the exclusive rem-
edy or the exclusive cause of action. See infra notes 189-200 and accompanying text. If
the Convention is the exclusive remedy, then state claims seeking punitive awards may
be brought subject to the $75,000 limitation. On the other hand, if the Convention is the
exclusive cause of action, no lawsuit may be brought under the guise of state law claims.
The distinction, however, blurs when one compares the similarities between preempting
only punitive claims and preempting all state claims to a holding that the Convention is
just the exclusive remedy or the exclusive cause of action. If plaintiffs could initiate suit
under state law, then confusion would continue over whether punitive awards could be
provided under the state claims. To avoid addressing a complicated issue completely and
to permit the Convention to act as a uniform guide on international airline liability, all
avenues of state action must be closed. Similarly, to avoid the confusion inherent in
permitting state law claims, the Convention must not only supply the exclusive remedy,
it must also provide the exclusive cause of action. Otherwise, the Convention could not
function as a uniform guide to airline liability and effectively limit such liability.
1 928 F.2d at 1273-74.
189 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1186 (1985).
190
The essential inquiry is whether the convention provides the exclusive liability
remedy for international air carriers by providing an independent cause of ac-
tion, thereby preempting state law, or whether it merely limits the amount of
recovery for a cause of action otherwise provided by state or federal law. We
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equivalent of stating that the Convention is the exclusive cause
of action, the court went on to state that the Warsaw Conven-
tion preempted Texas law in all areas the Convention covered.""1
The Fifth Circuit noted that "an obvious major purpose of the
Warsaw Convention was to secure uniformity of liability for air
carriers. ' 192 The Lockerbie court's reading of Boehringer is thus
not off the mark.
The Lockerbie court seems, however, to have missed the
mark in its analysis of a Ninth Circuit case. In re Mexico City
Aircrash of October 31, 1979193 the Ninth Circuit held that the
Warsaw Convention created a cause of action to sue for wrongful
death,9 without holding that the Convention was the exclusive
cause of action to sue under the Convention. In fact, the Ninth
Circuit expressly stated that "the delegates [of the Convention]
did not intend that the cause of action created by the Conven-
tion be exclusive."195 Undaunted, the Second Circuit in Lock-
erbie cited Mexico City for the proposition that the "Ninth Cir-
have not previously addressed this question .... We hold today that the War-
saw Convention creates the cause of action and is the exclusive remedy. Our
colleagues of the Second and Ninth Circuits previously have so concluded.
Id. at 458.
191 Id. at 459. Interestingly, Boehringer cites Benjamins for the proposition that the
Warsaw Convention creates a cause of action, although not necessarily the exclusive
cause of action. Id. On the other hand, Lockerbie cites Boehringer for the holding that
the Convention is the exclusive cause of action. 928 F.2d at 1273-74. The question then is
whether these two statements are consistent. If Boehringer is stating that the Conven-
tion creates a cause of action, but that the exclusive remedy for such a breach or a
breach based on some other legal theory is the Convention's liability limits, then Lock-
erbie is incorrect when it cites Boehringer for the proposition that the Convention cre-
ated an exclusive cause of action. Id. However, Boehringer also concluded that any state
law in conflict with the Convention is invalid under the preemption doctrine since the
Convention is equivalent to federal law. 737 F.2d at 459. While this is slightly different
from stating that the Convention creates the exclusive cause of action, when one exam-
ines the ramifications of allowing independent state claims under the Convention, it be-
comes clear that all state claims could potentially conflict with the Convention's goals.
See supra notes 139-79. In the end, the two holdings are therefore consistent because
independent state claims do conflict with the Convention; the Convention must therefore
be the exclusive cause of action.
192 737 F.2d at 459.
193 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983).
1 Id. at 416. Much like the Second Circuit's decision in Benjamins, the court in
Mexico City overruled a line of cases which held that the Convention did not create a
cause of action. Unlike Benjamins however, the Mexico City decision did not state that
the Convention was the exclusive cause of action to sue under the Convention. See supra
note 186.
191 708 F.2d at 414 n.25.
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cuit has rebutted the idea that a cause of action may be founded
on some law other than the Convention .... ,"' Here, the Lock-
erbie court clearly erred.197
Nevertheless, another Ninth Circuit decision cited by the
Lockerbie court does support the Second Circuit's exclusivity
holding. In In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 19749 8
survivors of passengers killed in a plane crash in Indonesia
brought wrongful death actions against Pan Am. The United
States District Court for the Central District of California per-
mitted a jury award of damages above the $75,000 Convention
limit. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by
applying California law, which prevented a decedent from com-
promising a survivor's right to a wrongful death recovery, in-
stead of applying the liability limits imposed by the Conven-
tion.19 In essence, the court held that to the extent that
California law would override the application of the Conven-
tion's $75,000 cap, California law was preempted by the Conven-
tion.200 While the court never directly stated that the Conven-
tion was the exclusive cause of action, its holding would have no
meaning if state claims continued to be available under the Con-
vention. Since the application of state law would prevent the
Convention from acting as a limitation on liability, by the lan-
guage of the Bali court all state claims must be preempted.
Nevertheless, like the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit's rea-
soning supports the Second Circuit's position that state punitive
damage claims contravene the Convention's goals. Therefore the
conclusion that the Convention should provide the exclusive
1" 928 F.2d at 1274.
197 In addition to creating a cause of action under the Convention, the Mexico City
court seems to have reasoned that any application of state law that resulted in an award
over the $75,000 Convention limitation would be inconsistent with and therefore pre-
empted by the Convention. Nevertheless, this reasoning can be read to lend support to
the Lockerbie decision to preempt all state law claims. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
the Warsaw Convention preempted state law to the extent that state law would affect
the recovery allowed by the Convention: to the extent that the application of state law
increased an airline's liability beyond the limitations envisioned by the Convention, state
law would be preempted. 708 F.2d at 414 n.25, 418. Assuming that litigation costs would
increase if state law claims seeking punitive damages were applicable under the Conven-
tion, the Mexico City decision could be used to justify the preemption of all state claims.
Mexico City, 708 F.2d at 414 n.25, 415-16, 418; Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1274-76.
193 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
19 684 F.2d 1301, 1306-08 (9th Cir. 1982).
20 Id. at 1308.
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cause of action logically flows from the decisions of the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, even though, neither Circuit directly held that
the Convention creates an exclusive cause of action.
3. Cases in Opposition to Lockerbie
The Second Circuit acknowledged that courts disagree on
whether state punitive damage claims are preempted by the
Convention. The court cited two cases where punitive damages
were not found to be preempted by the Warsaw Convention. 0
However, neither case cited by the court engaged in any sub-
stantive exclusivity inquiry. Moreover, one of the cited decisions
was recently overturned. 2  The dearth of judicial authority in
support of awarding punitive damages only lends credence to
the Second Circuit's conclusion that state punitive damage
claims are preempted by the Warsaw Convention.20 3
In Hill v. United Airlines204 the United States District
Court of Kansas held that passengers seeking recovery against
United Airlines for intentional misrepresentation of flight delays
could proceed with claims seeking punitive damages. The court
stated that "the provisions of Article 25(1), which makes an ex-
ception to defendant's limited liability ... might entitle plain-
201 Hill v. United Airlines, 550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982); In re Korean Air Lines
Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 932 F.2d 1475, 1490 (D.C. Cir.) (vacating $50 million punitive
jury award as a result of the shooting down of a Korean Airliner over the Sea of Japan
because the Convention is compensatory in nature only), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 616
(1991).
20 Korean Air Lines Disaster at 1490; see infra notes 207-10 and accompanying
text.
203 Hill, 550 F. Supp. at 1048 (defendant's summary judgment motion denied, per-
mitting plaintiffs to seek $10,000 punitive award for alleged intentional misrepresenta-
tion on the part of the airline); Korean Air Lines Disaster, 932 F.2d at 1479 (jury awards
$50 million in punitive damages in a wrongful death action governed by the Convention
and appellate court vacates punitive damage award), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 616 (1991);
In re Karachi, 729 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (summary judgment motion denied
which sought dismissal of punitive damage claims), rev'd in In re Lockerbie, 928 F.2d
1267 (2d Cir.) (denial of summary judgment reversed and punitive damage claims dis-
missed), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991). The result: Hill is the only current decision
that has not dismissed punitive claims or awards.
20" 550 F. Supp. at 1048. Hill involved the issue of whether the Warsaw Convention
precluded recovery by passengers who alleged that United Airlines intentionally misrep-
resented to them certain information concerning connecting flights. The court held that
an action based on intentional misrepresentation was within the scope of the Warsaw
Convention. Id. at 1054.
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tiffs to recover actual punitive damages ... .2 0l The court, how-
ever, was not directly faced with the issue of whether punitive
damages could be awarded under the Convention. Additionally,
courts that have directly examined the punitive damage issue
have not accepted the Hill decision as persuasive. °
The Second Circuit also cited In re Korean Air Lines Disas-
ter of September 1, 1983207 for the proposition that punitive
damage claims are available under the Convention. In Korean
Air Lines Disaster the United States District Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, without opinion, affirmed a jury award of $50
million in punitive damages for the wrongful deaths resulting
from the downing of a Korean Airline jet by a Soviet plane. Af-
ter the Second Circuit decided Lockerbie, however, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated that lower
court's affirmation of the punitive damage award, thereby
strengthening the Lockerbie court's holding that punitive dam-
205 Id. at 1056 (emphasis added). In denying defendant's motion to dismiss the in-
tentional misrepresentation claims, the court stated that plaintiffs might be entitled to
their punitive damage award claims if the plaintiffs could prove the required elements of
the intentional misrepresentation claims. This conclusion was based on the court's deter-
mination that plaintiffs properly included Article 25, which lifts liability limits under
Convention, in their complaint. Id. However, it is difficult to ascertain what the Hill
court meant by this statement. Did it mean that Article 25 provides for the inclusion of
punitive damage claims or that if the plaintiffs had not pleaded claims b sed on Article
25, a court could not consider whether to award the punitive damage claims beyond the
Convention's liability limits? Since the Hill decision does not address the issue of puni-
tive damages in any in depth manner, many courts have refused to follow it. Courts have
been unsure exactly what the Hill decision stands for in relation to punitive damage
awards. See infra note 206.
206 Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1277 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Hill stated only that the plaintiffs in
that case had properly invoked the willful misconduct provision, which if proved might
entitle plaintiffs to recover actual damages, but this holding was not supported by any
detailed reasoning."); Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1488-89, n.43 (11th
Cir. 1989) ("It is not clear whether the court in Hill held that punitive damages are
recoverable in an action governed by the Convention ... [but iln any event, to the extent
that Hill authorized recovery of punitive damages under the Warsaw Convention, we
decline to accept its holding."); In re Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Nevfoundland on
December 12, 1985, 684 F. Supp. 927, 933 (W.D. Ky. 1987) ("The reasoning in Hill is not
logically consistent and the court's holding is of dubious precedential value in this case.
Consequently, this court declines to follow the rule or decision in Hill."); Harpalani v.
Air-India, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 797,799 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("Only... [Hill] has suggested that
the Warsaw Convention does permit punitive damage awards. That court did so in dicta
without carefully examining the authority for punitive awards, and this court declines to
adopt its conclusion.").
207 932 F.2d 1475 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 616 (1991).
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age awards are barred under the Convention.2 °8
The District of Columbia Circuit in Korean Air Lines Dis-
aster construed the Convention in a manner that would promote
uniformity. The court noted that "[t]he uniform application of
the treaty would be threatened if the United States, alone
among contracting states, imposed a liability [standard] wholly
outside the compensatory scheme .... Undoubtedly, punitive
liability for international carriers would be controversial.., and
we should construe the Convention to avoid such a potential
source of divergence. ' 20 This analysis mirrors the Second Cir-
cuit's focus on uniformity and liability limitations. 210 Therefore,
208 As in the Lockerbie decision, the Supreme Court has declined to review the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's decision to dismiss the punitive
damage award. 112 S. Ct. 616 (1991).
209 932 F.2d at 1487.
210 Id. The court in Korean Air Lines Disaster clearly stated that its holding did not
reach the issue of whether the Convention preempts all state causes of action because
the vacated punitive claim was based on federal maritime law and not the Convention.
Id. at 1486. The court, however, did find that the Convention was purely compensatory
in nature.
This conclusion comports with our obligation to construe the Convention in a
manner that will promote uniformity. The uniform application of the treaty
would be threatened if the United States, alone among contracting parties, im-
posed a form of liability wholly-outside the compensatory scheme of [the Con-
vention.] Undoubtedly, punitive liability for international carriers "would be
controversial for most signatories," and we should construe the Convention to
avoid such a "potential source of divergence."
Id. at 1487 (citations omitted). The inference is that had the Korean Air Lines Disaster
court addressed the issue, it would have followed Lockerbie and found state claims pre-
empted by the Convention. Id.
The Korean Air Lines Disaster decision, however, was not without dissent. Judge
Mikva vigorously disagreed with the court's determination that punitive damages were
preempted under the Convention. 932 F.2d at 1490 (Mikva, J., dissenting). First, the
dissent did not believe that the Convention preempted punitive damage claims and ar-
gued instead that the court should have engaged in a choice of law analysis to determine
the applicable state law on the punitive damage issued. Id. Second, the dissent criticized
the majority for relying too heavily on the Lockerbie decision. Id. at 1491-92. Judge
Mikva believed that the Lockerbie court reached too far in holding that the Convention
provided the exclusive cause of action. Id. The dissent reasoned that there was a signifi-
cant difference between preempting punitive damage claims and preempting all state
law. To support this proposition, the dissent examined the text of the Convention and
concluded that Article 24 expressly preserved independent state actions. Id. at 1492.
"The Convention is not the exclusive remedy for passengers injured on international
flights, in fact, Article 24's reference to 'any action for damages, however founded' clearly
contemplates actions arising under separate sources of law ..... Id. The dissent focused
on the Supreme Court's instructions in Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd.,.490 U.S. 122
(1989), see supra notes 59 & 85, and determined that Article 24's plain meaning pre-
served independent state claims. 932 F.2d at 1493.
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with the exception of Hill,2 no court has held that punitive
damages are available in an action governed by the Warsaw
Convention.
CONCLUSION
By adopting the position that punitive damages are barred
under the Convention, the Second Circuit construed the Con-
vention in a manner consistent with the intended goals of the
Convention's drafters. The Second Circuit supported this con-
clusion by examining the potential chaos that might result if in-
dependent state claims seeking punitive awards were permitted
under the Convention. This potential confusion prompted the
court to preempt all state law claims, thus making the Conven-
tion the exclusive cause of action for claims within the Conven-
tion's scope.
While commentators and courts might criticize the Second
Circuit for paying too much heed to legislative intent or for
unnecessarily preempting all state claims, the decision was both
sound and necessary to insure uniform liability standards for the
international airline industry. As long as hundreds of airlines
and nations remain intertwined in international travel, set rules
are necessary to insure predictability in determining potential
liability. While preempting punitive claims and declaring the
Convention to be the exclusive cause of action is controversial,
Lockerbie will nevertheless help insure that international air-
lines receive needed guidance.
Since the Warsaw Convention continues to be the governing
law on liability standards for international air travel, courts are
obligated to enforce the current provisions of Convention. As the
supreme law of the land, any change in the structure of the Con-
vention must come from either changing the Convention itself or
from the United States withdrawing its membership. Until that
Having determined that the Convention's text was clear, the dissent did not ex-
amine the drafters' intent. Instead, Judge Mikva reasoned that the issue of punitive
damages should have been relegated to a choice of law determination. Id. at 1495-99.
The dissent's analysis, however, completely fails to examine the confusion and expense
that would arise in applying state law. The dissent fails to comprehend the effect a lit-
eral interpretation would have upon the Convention's ultimate goals. Therefore the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision to preempt all state claims is more faithful to the true spirit of the
Convention than is Judge Mikva's formalistic reading of the Convention's text.
211 550 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Kan. 1982).
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time it is the duty of courts to enforce the Convention's text and
goals. The Lockerbie court should be commended for fulfilling
this obligation by prohibiting the award of punitive damages
under the Warsaw Convention.
Howard T. Edelman
